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12 Sep 2026

Magazine analysis | 12 September 2026  The New Delhi BRICS summit carries the weight of a changing global order, but deep divisions over money, war, China, the West and strategic direction limit what the bloc can actually deliver. This magazine analysis examines whether BRICS can turn its growing influence into meaningful institutional power—or remain a powerful symbol with modest results. SummaryThe 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi brings together an increasingly influential but deeply divided grouping seeking a greater voice for the Global South. While BRICS has built institutions such as the New Development Bank and expanded cooperation across finance, health, education and development, its members remain divided over the dollar, wars, China, sanctions and the bloc's future direction. The article examines why a common BRICS currency remains unlikely and why more practical steps such as local-currency settlements and payment interoperability are more realistic. It also explores the tensions between India and China, the impact of Trump's tariff pressure and the difficulty of building EU-style institutional integration across such diverse economies and political systems. For India, the summit offers an opportunity to strengthen strategic autonomy and global influence, but bilateral diplomacy should not be mistaken for collective BRICS progress. The analysis concludes that BRICS is too important to dismiss but too divided to lead, making measurable delivery—not summit spectacle—the real test of its future. KeywordsBRICS 2026, BRICS Summit New Delhi, BRICS India, Global South, multipolar world, BRICS currency, New Development Bank, India China relations, global geopolitics Can a bloc that cannot agree on money, war or strategic direction still reshape the world order? The New Delhi summit can be a spectacular diplomatic event and still produce a modest collective result. BRICS has real weight, a real development bank and a legitimate Global South grievance. But its members remain divided over the dollar, Ukraine, West Asia, China, the United States and even the meaning of the bloc itself. The summit arrives with more weight than cohesion Delhi is being dressed as the capital of a changing world. Central roads are restricted, security cordons thicken around Bharat Mandapam, and the flags of the expanded BRICS are arranged to make a visual argument before the leaders make a political one. The 18th summit, on 12 and 13 September 2026, is being sold under the theme Building for Resilience Innovation Cooperation and Sustainability. The language is broad because the contradictions are broad. A group that includes China and India, Russia and Brazil, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, and countries that depend on Washington even while criticising it needs a vocabulary capacious enough to contain disagreement. [1] The honest forecast is therefore double-edged. The New Delhi meeting can be high-octane as theatre, as a diplomatic marketplace and as a sequence of bilateral encounters. It is much less likely to be high-impact as a collective act. BRICS is not meaningless. It is a significant bargaining platform, a symbol of Global South agency and the home of a real development bank. But its aggregate weight has not become strategic cohesion. The group is large enough to matter and divided enough to disappoint. India's official chairship material counts eleven members, including Saudi Arabia, and says the group represents 49.5 per cent of the world's population, about 40 per cent of global GDP and 26 per cent of global trade. Reuters has noted that Saudi Arabia was invited but had not formally accepted the invitation. That discrepancy is not a footnote; it is an early lesson in BRICS' institutional looseness. Even the question of who is fully inside the room can carry different answers. [1][3] Born as an acronym became a grievance BRICS began as an investment forecast, not a treaty. In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill coined BRIC to describe Brazil, Russia, India and China as economies whose growth could reshape the global balance. Governments then turned the acronym into a summit process in 2009; South Africa joined in 2010-11, and Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE entered in 2024, followed by Indonesia in 2025. Expansion has made the platform more representative of the non-Western world, even as it has made consensus harder. [1][3] The original grievance remains legitimate. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and UN Security Council still carry institutional arrangements designed for a post-1945 distribution of power. Emerging economies want a greater voice, cheaper and more flexible development finance, less vulnerability to sanctions and a say in the rules governing trade, technology, energy and climate. BRICS gives that grievance a diplomatic address. Its importance lies partly in the fact that a country can enter the room without having to choose between Washington and Beijing. That is why dismissing BRICS as mere anti-Americanism is analytically lazy. Yet treating it as an embryonic world government is equally misleading. Its members want a less Western-dominated system, but they do not agree on the architecture that should replace it. Russia wants a shield against sanctions and a counterweight to the West. China sees a long-term opportunity to rebalance global power. India and Brazil prefer reform without an anti-Western crusade. The Gulf states want options, not rupture. The same word multipolarity hides several incompatible projects. One bank many declarations BRICS has built more than its harshest critics admit. The New Development Bank is its clearest institutional achievement. Established in 2015, it finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets. Its own current figures show 139 approved projects and about 42.9 billion dollars in approved financing, covering clean energy, water, transport, housing and digital infrastructure. [4] The Contingent Reserve Arrangement also offers a potential liquidity backstop, while working groups have sustained cooperation in health, agriculture, science, education, culture and counter-terrorism. But one functioning bank cannot carry the rhetorical weight of an alternative order. The NDB is still small beside the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the immense financing needs of its members. Its exposure to sanctions and compliance constraints, especially around Russia, shows that BRICS institutions still operate inside the financial system they seek to diversify. A bank can lend in local currencies; it cannot by itself manufacture trust, liquidity or a new reserve asset. The deeper weakness is institutional. BRICS has no constitutive treaty, permanent secretariat with independent authority, common market, free-trade agreement, parliament, court or enforcement mechanism. It rotates the chair, generates ministerial tracks and relies on consensus. Declarations are politically useful but not legally binding. The model is flexible enough to keep rivals together, but too loose to compel delivery. The result is a familiar cycle: a grand communique, a working group, a pilot project and then a quiet transfer of attention to the next chair. The question is not whether meetings have happened. More than 350 meetings and high-level engagements across 25 Indian cities during the 2026 chairship are evidence of activity. The question is whether activity changes behaviour. A group can be busy without becoming powerful. [1] The currency mirage The common BRICS currency is the bloc's most marketable fantasy and its least feasible project. A shared currency is not a coloured note or a digital token. It requires monetary coordination, exchange-rate discipline, capital-account rules, fiscal arrangements, a lender of last resort, a mechanism for settling trade imbalances and enough political trust to accept painful adjustment when economies diverge. The euro took decades of legal and economic integration, and even Europe has struggled with the consequences of one monetary policy applied to different economies. BRICS is nowhere near that starting line. Its members have sharply different inflation histories, capital controls, exchange-rate regimes, debt profiles, financial systems and political priorities. They are separated by oceans and chokepoints rather than woven into a contiguous market. China is economically dominant inside the grouping, while India's strategic fear is straightforward: a currency designed to escape dollar dependence could become a renminbi-centred system. New Delhi does not want to exchange one asymmetry for another. The dollar is also more than a political symbol. The IMF reported that the US dollar accounted for 56.77 per cent of disclosed global foreign-exchange reserves in the fourth quarter of 2025, while the renminbi accounted for 1.95 per cent. The Federal Reserve describes the dollar's advantage as resting on deep and liquid capital markets, global payment use, international banking and reserve-asset credibility. [8][9] A payment app cannot reproduce that ecosystem overnight. India's more realistic proposal is to link existing systems and, eventually, central-bank digital currencies. Reuters reported that New Delhi was pushing CBDC interoperability for faster cross-border payments while explicitly distinguishing that aim from replacing the dollar. The technical obstacles are formidable: data rules, capital controls, cybersecurity, sanctions screening, currency swaps and the problem of what happens when trade is chronically unbalanced. If India imports far more from China than it exports, settling in rupees and yuan changes the plumbing without eliminating the imbalance. [6] The answer to the common-currency question is therefore clear. No BRICS currency is likely to emerge from New Delhi, and none is close to becoming a credible euro-like alternative. What may advance is financial diversification: selected local-currency settlements, connected instant-payment systems, CBDC pilots and more NDB lending in national currencies. That is useful. It is not de-dollarisation achieved. The wars that expose the fiction of unity The summit's most immediate problem is not money but war. On Ukraine, Moscow wants BRICS to challenge sanctions and narrate the conflict as a struggle against NATO and Western coercion. China criticises unilateral sanctions and calls for a political settlement without fully endorsing Russia's conduct. India maintains defence and energy ties with Moscow, refuses Western sanctions, yet repeatedly calls for dialogue and respect for sovereignty. Brazil, South Africa and the newer members have their own calculations. The familiar formula of recalling national positions is diplomatic craftsmanship, but it is also a confession that the bloc has no common policy. West Asia is even more corrosive because the conflict runs through the membership. Iran wants the group to condemn the US-Israeli attacks. The UAE rejects Tehran's allegations and insists that Iranian attacks on Gulf territory and maritime routes also be named. In May, BRICS foreign ministers failed to issue a joint statement; India released a chair's statement and outcome document that acknowledged differing views. [5] The leaders' summit must now prove that the disagreement can be managed without pretending it does not exist. India's balancing act is unusually exposed. It needs Iranian connectivity and energy options, Gulf stability, safe sea lanes, a working relationship with Israel, access to US technology and a diplomatic relationship with Russia and China. It cannot afford a BRICS text that sounds like an Iranian communique, nor one that makes the bloc look indifferent to a member under attack. A carefully vague declaration may preserve the ritual. It will not constitute a common foreign policy. This is the central contradiction of BRICS diplomacy: the group can agree that the global system is unequal while disagreeing about who is violating it. It can denounce unilateral sanctions without agreeing on whether sanctions should be lifted. It can call for sovereignty while its members accuse one another of attacks. Consensus language can prevent a rupture, but ambiguity is not the same thing as strategic unity. The dragon and the elephant in the same tent The most consequential contradiction sits inside BRICS' founding core. India and China both want a more multipolar world and a larger voice for the Global South. They are also rivals with an unresolved Himalayan boundary, a deadly 2020 Galwan clash and competing ambitions across the Indian Ocean, South Asia, technology and manufacturing. A disengagement arrangement reached in 2024 and Xi Jinping's visit to India after seven years create a diplomatic opening, but not a strategic settlement. [10] The bilateral encounter may be the summit's most valuable event, but it should not be mislabelled as a BRICS breakthrough. If Modi and Xi stabilise patrolling, expand military communication or reduce trade friction, both governments gain. Yet a handshake cannot dissolve the border dispute, the trade deficit or the contest over regional influence. BRICS is useful here as a calendar that puts rivals in the same city. It is not a court that can bind them. China's economic weight creates a second anxiety. Any serious BRICS payment network, reserve arrangement or infrastructure fund would require substantial Chinese participation. That can make the institution more capable, but also more China-centred. India's rational response is to stay inside, build coalitions with Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt and the Gulf members, and prevent any one power from turning BRICS into its instrument. That is a strategy of management, not transformation. Trump's tariffs cannot create the trust that members lack Donald Trump's tariff threats supply BRICS with a convenient external antagonist. Washington has warned of punitive tariffs if BRICS members create a currency or back an instrument designed to replace the dollar. The threat is coercive, but its effect is not the one its authors may want. It creates pressure for payment diversification while also pushing vulnerable members toward separate bargains with the United States. [3] The finance ministers and central bank governors meeting before the summit criticised unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures as distortive and inconsistent with WTO rules. They also called for practical progress on cross-border payment interoperability. [7] That is a common position, but it is a limited one. A statement against tariffs is easier than a collective retaliation plan. Economic exposure is uneven. India, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa need Western markets, technology, investment and dollar liquidity. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have deep security and financial links with Washington, and their currencies and energy markets remain closely connected to the dollar. Russia and Iran have stronger incentives to build sanctions-resistant channels, but their preferred system is not automatically acceptable to members that fear secondary sanctions or financial instability. India's own trade diplomacy makes the contradiction visible. Reuters reported a February 2026 US-India framework that cut the US tariff on Indian goods to 18 per cent from 50 per cent in exchange for lower Indian barriers, altered energy ties and a commitment to reduce Russian-oil purchases. Whether every part of the arrangement survives unchanged is less important than the strategic signal: when real market access is at stake, New Delhi negotiates bilaterally. [11] Trump can make BRICS countries resent American pressure; he cannot make them share the same risk tolerance. Tariffs may accelerate an incremental move away from dollar-only settlement, especially in commodities, energy and sanctioned trade. They will not create a unified BRICS trade policy. The members are not a tariff union; they are a collection of economies with different export baskets, market dependencies and red lines. Their solidarity is real in principle and conditional in practice. The European Union analogy is a trap BRICS is often presented as a future EU of the Global South. The analogy collapses under inspection. The European project was built among geographically contiguous countries with dense trade, shared regulatory problems, legal institutions and a history of pooling sovereignty. Its common market created interdependence before the euro attempted monetary union. The European Commission, Parliament, Court and acquis gave political promises an enforcement pathway. BRICS spans four continents. Its supply chains are less naturally integrated; its transport corridors cross maritime chokepoints and politically contested spaces; its per-capita incomes and development stages are radically different. More important than geography, however, is the absence of convergent political trust. India and China are competitors, Iran and the UAE are security rivals, Egypt and Ethiopia have tensions around the Nile, Russia is at war and several members rely on Western security or financial systems. Distance does not make international cooperation impossible. It does make institutional integration more expensive. The decisive difference is that Europe gradually pooled sovereignty, while BRICS members defend sovereignty as the protection against one another and against the West. BRICS can build issue-specific cooperation. It cannot simply copy the EU's route from a common market to a supranational community. Modi and the summit that risks becoming larger than the bloc For Narendra Modi, New Delhi is not only a BRICS chairship; it is a stage. Hosting Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian allows the Prime Minister to appear as the intermediary who can speak to Washington, Moscow, Tehran, the Gulf and the wider Global South. The image is politically valuable because India's domestic atmosphere has become less deferential. The 2026 Gen Z and Cockroach Janta Party protests over examination failures, unemployment and institutional accountability forced the resignation of the Education Minister and punctured the aura of political invulnerability. [12] There is nothing unusual about a leader using international diplomacy to reinforce domestic legitimacy. The danger is more specific: the host may confuse the visibility of the leader with the capacity of the institution. A motorcade, a family photograph and a carefully choreographed Delhi can project arrival. They cannot settle the India-China border, generate jobs, lower food prices or substitute for democratic accountability. This is where the word megalomania becomes analytically useful, if used carefully. It is not a diagnosis of a person. It describes the temptation to make the summit's grandeur a proxy for its outcomes - to make the host leader's image larger than the bloc's actual capacity. The summit may be more valuable to Modi's international branding than to BRICS' collective machinery. Xi's visit, Modi's meeting with Putin and the Iran track can produce useful bilateral results, but bilateral diplomacy is not the same as institutional delivery. The Delhi lockdown intensifies the symbolism. When commuters, vendors and workers absorb the costs of a summit built around the language of resilience and inclusiveness, the event must answer a simple question: resilience for whom? Global leadership that requires the ordinary city to disappear for the cameras can look less like public diplomacy and more like state-managed spectacle. A Tibetan protest near the security perimeter underscored the limits of total control. What would count as a real outcome A non-damp-squib summit does not need to create a currency or end a war. It needs to replace slogans with measurable, voluntary and reviewable delivery. The first test is payments: a named pilot corridor, published technical standards, a timetable for CBDC or instant-payment interoperability and a transparent method for managing currency swaps and trade imbalances. The second is finance: a larger and more nimble NDB pipeline, more local-currency lending, and public milestones for projects rather than only aggregate approvals. The third is economic resilience: customs cooperation, common standards, trade documentation, supply-chain mapping and support for small businesses. These are less glamorous than a dollar-dethroning announcement, but they are where transaction costs fall and jobs can be created. The fourth is climate and disaster cooperation: shared early-warning systems, satellite data, resilient infrastructure and rapid-response protocols. A theme of sustainability becomes credible only when a village, port or city can show that the warning arrived earlier and the bridge was built safer. The fifth is institutional honesty. BRICS should publish a clear membership list, define the partner-country category, explain whether every matter requires unanimity and report what each chair inherits from the previous one. If consensus remains the rule, members should stop describing every statement as collective policy. A platform becomes more credible when it admits the difference between a common position, a chair's summary and a national reservation. India's most intelligent strategy is neither to abandon BRICS nor to pretend it is an alternative world government. New Delhi should use the group for what it can do: widen the bargaining space of the Global South, build practical finance and payment links among willing members, keep China from monopolising the agenda and preserve bridges to Western markets. Strategic autonomy works only when it is operational, not when it is printed on a summit banner. The verdict high octane outside damp squib inside Will the New Delhi summit be high-octane? Yes - in security, symbolism, bilateral meetings, media choreography and the sheer presence of leaders who represent an enormous share of humanity. Will it transform BRICS into a coherent alternative pole? No. The common currency will not happen. The dollar will not be dethroned by declaration. The wars in Ukraine and West Asia will not acquire a shared BRICS solution. The India-China rivalry will not be dissolved by a photograph. Trump's tariff threats will not produce a common economic front because every member calculates vulnerability differently. Yet a damp squib is not the same as a complete failure. BRICS matters because it gives the Global South a room of its own, and because even imperfect institutions can change bargaining power over time. The NDB, local-currency lending, payment interoperability, climate finance, health cooperation and collective demands for IMF, World Bank and UN reform are not nothing. They are the beginnings of a more plural order - provided they are funded, measured and implemented. The historical significance of New Delhi will therefore be diagnostic rather than revolutionary. BRICS has become too important to dismiss and too divided to lead. It is a barometer of multipolarity, not yet its engine. Its promise is representation, bargaining power and experimentation. Its poor delivery is the absence of binding rules, common strategic interests and an enforcement culture. The final verdict is blunt. India can host a spectacular summit, and Modi can emerge from it looking like the indispensable statesman of a fractured world. But if the declaration contains only managed ambiguity, the spectacle will be bigger than the bloc. BRICS will leave Delhi with its relevance reaffirmed and its contradictions unresolved: a big promise, a modest delivery, and a warning that multipolarity without trust is merely a crowded photograph. Sources and Further Reading [1] Press Information Bureau Government of India BRICS Evolution Cooperation and India's Leadership (10 September 2026). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=159946&ModuleId=3&reg=3&lang=1 Official 2026 chairship, membership, scale and ministerial outcomes. [2] BRICS India 2026 About Us (accessed 12 September 2026). https://www.brics2026.gov.in/about-us/ Official Indian presidency site. [3] Reuters The evolution of BRICS and its challenges today (12 September 2026). https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/evolution-brics-its-challenges-today-2026-09-12/ History, membership uncertainty, NDB, payment initiatives and Trump tariff threats. [4] New Development Bank Home and About NDB (accessed 12 September 2026). https://www.ndb.int/ Official project and financing figures. [5] Reuters BRICS talks end without joint statement exposing divisions over war in Iran (15 May 2026). https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-issues-chair-statement-after-brics-meeting-amid-differences-over-gulf-2026-05-15/ Iran UAE disagreement and the May ministerial outcome. [6] Reuters India to push BRICS digital currency link despite hurdles (10 September 2026). https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-push-brics-digital-currency-link-despite-hurdles-says-2026-09-10/ CBDC interoperability and political and technical constraints. [7] Reuters BRICS finance chiefs urge reform of global development financial institutions (11 September 2026). https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/brics-finance-chiefs-urge-reform-global-development-financial-institutions-2026-09-11/ Tariffs, payment interoperability and institutional reform. [8] International Monetary Fund Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (26 March 2026). https://data.imf.org/en/news/imf%20data%20brief%20march%2027 Reserve shares for the US dollar and renminbi in 2025 Q4. [9] Federal Reserve The International Role of the US Dollar 2025 Edition (18 July 2025). https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-international-role-of-the-us-dollar-2025-edition-20250718.html Structural foundations of dollar international use. [10] Reuters India China relations from conflict to cautious thaw (12 September 2026). https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-china-relations-conflict-cautious-thaw-2026-09-12/ Galwan, disengagement, trade and Xi's 2026 visit. [11] Reuters Trump says agreed trade deal with India (2 February 2026). https://www.reuters.com/world/india/trump-says-agreed-trade-deal-with-india-2026-02-02/ Reported tariff reduction and associated bilateral concessions. [12] Reuters India's Instagram Gen Z dents Modi's aura ahead of key state polls (25 July 2026). https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-instagram-gen-z-dents-modis-aura-ahead-key-state-polls-2026-07-25/ Domestic youth protests and political image context. ...Read more

12 Sep 2026

VEIU 2026 brings educators, climate advocates, institutional leaders and change-makers from across the world to Nairobi, linking quality education, climate action, transformational leadership and sustainable development. The five-day summit aims to turn global dialogue into lasting partnerships, practical action and meaningful community impact. SummaryVEIU 2026 will bring global educators, researchers, leaders, businesses, NGOs and change-makers together in Nairobi from 27 November to 1 December 2026. Centred on climate action, quality education, transformational leadership and sustainable development, the summit seeks to move beyond conferences and declarations towards practical collaboration. Its programme includes international forums, graduation and recognition ceremonies, partnership and MoU signings, climate discussions, community outreach and cultural engagement. The article highlights the need for education to serve the public good and for leadership to connect global challenges with local realities. It also stresses that partnerships must produce measurable outcomes rather than remain ceremonial agreements. Ultimately, VEIU 2026 presents Nairobi as a platform where diverse perspectives can come together to build more responsible, inclusive and sustainable futures. KeywordsVEIU 2026, VEIU International Summit, Nairobi summit, global partnerships, climate action, quality education, transformational leadership, sustainable development, Vision for Excellence International University, Nairobi Kenya From 27 November to 1 December 2026, Nairobi will become the meeting ground for educators, climate advocates, institutional leaders, researchers and change-makers committed to turning global conversation into meaningful action. Nairobi Is Ready for a Different Kind of Summit Nairobi does not merely host conversations about the future. It makes the future visible. It is a city where technology and tradition meet, where universities, enterprises, civil society, culture and community life exist alongside the raw challenges of inequality, climate vulnerability and rapid urban transformation. It is both an African capital and a global crossroads—a fitting setting for a summit that seeks to connect excellence with responsibility. Against this vibrant backdrop, Vision for Excellence International University—VEIU—under the able leadership of its very young and dynamic Africa Chancellor, Dr James Bamwesa, will convene the VEIU 2026 International Summit from 27 November to 1 December 2026. Spread across five days and four nights, the gathering will bring together university leaders, graduates, academics, researchers, government representatives, development partners, business executives, entrepreneurs, NGOs, faith leaders, students and professionals from Africa and around the world. Its central theme is ambitious and urgent: Building Global Partnerships for Climate Action, Quality Education, Transformational Leadership and Sustainable Development. This is not a decorative slogan. It is a statement about how the world must now learn to work. Speakers:Prof James Bamwesa / D.R CongoMahesh Kumar / IndiaDr.Malini EaganathanCorina Sujdea / RomaniaDr Rajanikant Bhatt / IndiaDr Susan Anjalo / KenyaLia Rusu / RomaniaDr Manuela Dan / DenmarkErmina Raescu / RomaniaDr Watongoka Hubert / D.R CongoDr Ezzat Hassan / EgyptProf Ujjwal K. Chowdhury / IndiaProf. Ryo Takahashi  / JapanDr Jimmy Ambajo / KenyaDr. Anabel A. Njiiri / KenyaTithi Bhalla / UK A Summit with a Question, Not Just a Schedule The world has no shortage of conferences. It has no shortage of declarations, photographs, ceremonial handshakes and carefully worded resolutions. What it needs is a stronger connection between knowledge and action. The VEIU 2026 International Summit is designed around that larger question: What happens when experts, scholars, leaders, innovators and change-makers come together with the intention not merely to speak, but to build? The answer cannot be measured only by the number of delegates in a hall. It must be measured by the partnerships that continue after the event, the ideas that become programmes, the students who find new opportunities, the communities that receive practical support and the institutions that become more accountable to the future. The summit programme reflects this wider ambition. It will include international conferences, leadership forums, a climate action and sustainable development forum, a graduation ceremony for VEIU students, honorary doctorate awards, international excellence awards, strategic partnership and Memorandum of Understanding signing ceremonies, a meeting of the Board Members of Together for Africa, and community outreach and cultural experiences in Kenya. Together, these elements create something more meaningful than a conventional academic gathering. They create a leadership laboratory. Education Must Become a Force for Public Good Quality education is one of the summit’s four central pillars because education remains the most powerful long-term instrument of social transformation. But education cannot be reduced to buildings, examinations, certificates or institutional rankings. Its deeper purpose is to develop people capable of thinking independently, working collaboratively, acting ethically and responding creatively to complex problems. The summit’s international graduation ceremony will therefore carry a meaning beyond celebration. Every graduation is also a public promise. A graduate leaves not only with knowledge, but with a greater responsibility to society. The real value of a degree is demonstrated when learning improves decisions, strengthens communities and expands human possibility. The international character of the Nairobi gathering reinforces this idea. When people from different educational systems, cultures and professional backgrounds meet, learning moves in multiple directions. A Kenyan perspective can challenge an Indian assumption. A European experience can illuminate an African priority. A Japanese approach to discipline and innovation can enrich a global conversation. A Malaysian, Egyptian or Congolese insight can reveal the limits of one-size-fits-all solutions. That is leadership learning at its best: not the transfer of information from one expert to an audience, but the creation of new understanding between people. Climate Action Is the True Test of Leadership Climate action cannot remain a specialist conversation confined to environmental forums. It is now inseparable from education, public health, food security, migration, livelihoods, urban planning, finance, technology and social justice. A community facing water stress experiences climate change differently from a corporation calculating its emissions. A student worried about employment sees sustainability through a different lens from a policymaker designing a national transition. The climate action and sustainable development forum at VEIU 2026 has the potential to bring these perspectives into the same room. The essential leadership question is not simply whether the world understands climate change. It is whether institutions are prepared to change their priorities because of what they understand. Transformational leaders must be able to connect global goals with local realities. They must ask how sustainability can create dignified work, how innovation can reach underserved communities, how education can prepare young people for green economies and how partnerships can move resources towards those who need them most. Climate action requires more than individual virtue. It requires institutional courage, financial commitment and cross-border collaboration. No university, government, NGO or business can solve the challenge alone. The summit’s emphasis on global partnerships is therefore not an accessory to climate action. It is its operating principle. Leadership Begins Where Certainty Ends Transformational leadership is often confused with charisma. Yet the most valuable leaders are not necessarily the loudest people in the room. They are the people who can listen deeply, absorb complexity, recognise their own limitations and still act with courage. The Nairobi summit will place leadership alongside education and climate action because the three are inseparable. Education without leadership can remain theoretical. Leadership without ethical grounding can become domination. Climate action without imagination can become a technical exercise without social legitimacy. The leaders of the next decade will need to work across disciplines and identities. They will need to understand data and human emotion, innovation and inequality, economic growth and ecological limits. They will need to build trust in environments where trust is increasingly fragile. Most importantly, they will need to understand that leadership is not the possession of power. It is the responsible use of influence. A Room Large Enough for the World The summit’s most powerful asset may be the diversity of voices assembled in Nairobi. At its centre will be Prof James Bamwesa, Chancellor of Vision for Excellence International University and a leading figure in the summit’s vision. The programme also brings together contributors from Africa, Asia and Europe, reflecting the belief that the world’s most urgent challenges require more than one geography or one intellectual tradition. The international speaker group includes Dr Malini Eaganathan from Malaysia; Mr Mahesh Kumar, Prof Ujjwal Anu Chowdhury and Dr Rajanikant Bhatt from India; and Ms Corina Sujdea, President of RELTTAW, together with Ms Lia Rusu and Ms Ermina Raescu from Romania. Kenya will be represented by Dr Susan Anjalo, Dr Anabel A Njiiri and Dr Jimmy Ambajo. The wider African presence includes Dr Ezzat Hassan from Egypt, Dr Watongoka Hubert from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mr Jean Hubert from Cameroon. Dr Manuela Dan brings the perspective of Denmark, Prof Ryo Takahashi represents Japan, and Ms Tithi Bhalla contributes the perspective of the United Kingdom. This is more than a list of speakers. It is a map of possibility. The significance lies not in placing famous names on a stage, but in allowing different experiences to challenge one another. The summit can become a space where participants discover that international collaboration does not mean erasing difference. It means using difference intelligently. Partnerships That Survive the Handshake The main organiser is Vision for Excellence International University, Africa, with RELTTAW serving as principal partner. The summit is supported by an extensive network of partner organisations: USK-BUKAVU, the World Book of Records London, SustainVerse.org, the International University Institute of Innovation, Global Goals Connections, EDX Global, AAHAE, the International Association of Theological Institutions, FIDES Denmark and RELTTAW. Their participation sends an important message. Global partnerships must be more than logos arranged beneath an event title. They must create pathways for shared research, student mobility, institutional development, innovation, community engagement, entrepreneurship and sustainable action. A Memorandum of Understanding is easy to sign. The harder task is to turn it into a living relationship—with responsibilities, timelines, measurable outcomes and people committed to implementation. The Nairobi gathering will be judged by whether its partnerships continue to produce value long after the final ceremony. The strongest collaborations will be those that connect institutions not only to one another, but also to communities that are usually excluded from international conversations. Recognition Must Become Responsibility Honorary doctorate awards and international excellence awards—including recognition for women in leadership—will form an important part of the summit. In a world filled with badges, titles and public profiles, recognition must be handled with seriousness. An honorary doctorate should not be understood merely as a ceremonial distinction. It should represent a record of contribution and a renewed obligation to serve. Similarly, excellence awards should not only celebrate achievement. They should make achievement visible as a source of inspiration for others. Recognition becomes meaningful when it encourages young people, honours public-minded work and strengthens the social value of leadership. The summit’s recognition ceremonies can therefore become moments of reflection: What kind of excellence does the world need now? Is success measured only by personal advancement, or also by the number of lives improved, institutions strengthened and futures protected? “Together for Africa” Must Be a Working Promise The presence of the Together for Africa initiative gives the summit a distinctive moral and developmental centre. The scheduled meeting of its Board Members in Nairobi suggests a focus beyond conference proceedings. It points towards an effort to build sustained cooperation around African priorities, African talent and African possibilities. The community outreach programme and Kenya cultural and tourism experience are equally significant. A summit about Africa should not speak about Africa only from inside a conference hall. It must encounter the people, places, histories and aspirations that give the continent its meaning. Culture is not an optional addition to development. It shapes identity, dignity, social cohesion and economic opportunity. Community engagement, likewise, reminds leaders that every grand policy ultimately reaches a real person, family, school, workplace or neighbourhood. “Together for Africa” is therefore best understood as a working verb. It asks participants to move from speaking for communities to listening to them, working with them and investing in their future. Five Days, One Leadership Laboratory Across five days, VEIU 2026 will offer participants multiple entry points into leadership learning. The graduation ceremony will underline the public purpose of education. The international leadership conference will explore how influence can be exercised ethically and effectively. The climate and sustainable development forum will connect environmental responsibility with institutional action. The partnership and MoU ceremonies will test whether cooperation can become more than symbolism. The excellence awards will ask what achievement should look like in an unequal and uncertain world. The community and cultural programmes will bring the conversation back to people and place. A participant may arrive in Nairobi seeking a certificate, a connection, a platform or a new professional opportunity. The deeper value of the summit will be found in what that participant carries home: a more expansive understanding of leadership, a sharper awareness of global interdependence and perhaps one partnership capable of changing a community. That is the difference between attending an event and becoming part of a movement. Where Excellence Meets the World The VEIU 2026 International Summit comes at a moment when the world is searching for bridges—between generations, nations, disciplines, institutions and communities. Nairobi offers the setting. VEIU offers the platform. The speakers offer diverse experience. The partner organisations offer networks. But the final outcome will depend on the willingness of participants to learn, listen and act. The summit’s promise can be expressed simply: together for education, together for climate action, together for leadership and together for global partnerships. From Africa to Europe, Asia and beyond, one shared vision will come into focus—that excellence is not complete until it serves humanity. www.SustainVerse.org is proud to be the media partner of this historic leadership summit at Nairobi VEIU 2026 International SummitNairobi, Kenya | 27 November–1 December 2026Theme: Building Global Partnerships for Climate Action, Quality Education, Transformational Leadership and Sustainable DevelopmentContact: info@veiuniversity.org | +40 769 266 040 | +254 759 913 318 ...Read more

11 Sep 2026

Ahmedabad, once seen as a pioneer in urban climate adaptation, has been ranked the least climate-resilient major city in the world in a new AlphaGeo study. The finding exposes a widening gap between the city’s climate-risk exposure and the effectiveness of its adaptation measures.  SummaryA new AlphaGeo study has placed Ahmedabad at the top of a global ranking of cities facing the highest residual climate risk, raising questions about whether existing adaptation measures are keeping pace with worsening hazards. The study assessed 72 major cities using its Climate Risk & Resilience Index, which considers both physical exposure to hazards and the level of protection provided by adaptation measures. Ahmedabad recorded a resilience-adjusted risk score of 41, largely driven by extreme heat, while several other South Asian cities also featured among the higher-risk locations. The ranking is particularly significant because Ahmedabad has long been presented as a climate-adaptation pioneer. Following the deadly 2010 heatwave, the city introduced South Asia’s first Heat Action Plan, with measures including heat alerts, public-health advisories, cooling interventions and reflective roofs. However, the AlphaGeo assessment suggests that such interventions have not been sufficient to close the city’s wider adaptation gap as climate threats intensify.  The study also highlights a broader South Asian problem, where cities face substantial exposure to heat, flooding and other hazards while adaptation investment remains comparatively limited. Hyderabad, Multan, Dhaka, Kolkata and Lahore were among the other cities with high resilience-adjusted risk scores. In contrast, Chicago recorded the lowest score among the cities studied, while Beijing, Tianjin and Shenzhen were highlighted for relatively strong adaptation efficiency.  For Ahmedabad, the challenge extends beyond heat. Rapid concrete development, limited tree cover in several neighbourhoods, heat-retaining surfaces, shrinking natural drainage channels and waterlogging during intense rainfall can increase residents’ exposure to climate extremes. The risks are also unevenly distributed, with poorer communities often having less access to shade, cooling and reliable infrastructure.  The study therefore raises a larger question about what climate resilience should actually mean for a city. A heat action plan or adaptation policy can provide an important framework, but resilience ultimately depends on whether those measures translate into safer neighbourhoods, functioning infrastructure and protection for people most exposed to climate hazards. For Ahmedabad, the ranking is a warning that climate leadership cannot be measured only by the existence of policies; it must also be judged by how effectively those policies reduce risk on the ground.  Original Writer & Courtesy Original writer: Rajiv Shah  Original article: “Ahmedabad world’s least climate resilient major city: AlphaGeo study”Courtesy: Counterview.net Counterview.net ...Read more

10 Sep 2026

  SummaryThe present is tumultuous with all kinds of disasters looming in and guess what, we are to blame mostly. In the actively changing and evolving Himalayas, claws of so called development seep in causing the Himalayas to bleed and the rivers changing their courses, changing their planform, often flooding and leaving millions homeless. Be it the charlands of West Bengal or the upstream stretches of Ganges in the Himalayas, anthropogenic activities in the form of river engineering, development of smart cities, river linking projects and what not, we are interrupting with the fluvial dynamics only to get doomed.  KeywordsAvulsion, fluvial dynamics, Anthropocene, equilibrium  Avulsion and shifts in river courses are characterized by scouring of riverbed and banks. These phenomena are common in case of Himalayan rivers and have been on the increase in the Anthropocene. Humans can completely alter a river system turning it into a controlled one by damming its course, by flow diversion, by dredging or clearing the channel, by straightening the channel pattern or by increasing its supply via an artificial channel. In order to control flooding and river bank erosion, channels are frequently modified. Modifications of channels often include channel widening, channel deepening, artificially cutting meanders and even channel straightening. This jeopardizes the hydrologic regime. Also, if channelization occurs, higher flows are often found downstream as the water rushes out of the channelized reach. High backwaters are resulted, resulting channel deposition lowering the channel capacity.   A direct change in the river system is caused when dams are constructed. The hydrologic regime is altered by flow regulation, decreasing peak flows and increasing low flow. As a result, sediment transport capacity is modified inducing erosion and deposition affecting channel morphology. Dams also cause deposition in and above the reservoirs which thereby lose their capacity to retain water. Spillway water from dams is devoid of sediment load and thus tends to erode the channel immediately downstream.  The case of Aswan dam can be cited as an example where scour erosion is noted in the lower reaches, with a lean sediment transport and downstream erosion as the flow is regulated. Increase in depth and decrease in width is also reported for other channels which have experienced dam construction.  Morphologic discourse of the Ganga valley leads to its classification into 7 segments (Singh and Singh, 1992). Variation in discharge, sediment load, ground slope, anthropogenic activities and tectonics result in variation in channel morphology (Valdiya, 2003). Geology, geomorphology, climate alongwith human influence modifies fluvial dynamics. The outer Himalayan belt consists of recently uplifted Siwalik of Miocene Pliestocene detritus filled sediments – coarse sandstones, clays and conglomerates. Except the Siwaliks, the concerned region is a portion of the Ganga megafan and this surface shows several north-south aligned drainage channels (Shukla et al., 2001). This region is deeply incised by the active Ganga River and other rivers. Active incision of channel over the megafan surface is evidenced by the prominent channel scarps.  Over the years, channel sedimentation with the formation of channel bars in Ganga and other rivers is observed. Decline in the number of bars accompanied with increase in size of the bars indicates rapid silt deposition. Sandbars are observed to change occasionally during floods. The shifting nature of Ganga channel is evidenced by the presence of an abandoned channel within the cross section situated below the Chandi bridge, located on the left bank of river Ganga at Nildhara area.  The Bhimgoda barrage is located on river Ganga at Har ki Pauri. It was built as the headworks of upper Ganges canal. The initial barrage was completed by 1854. Replaced twice, the barrage was completed in 1983. The primary purpose of the barrage was irrigation; it was also used to generate hydroelectricity and used for flood control. The barrage has a length of 454 m and a spillway capacity of 19,300 m3/s.  The local geomorphology of the Ganga River is significantly altered due to the construction of the Bhimgoda barrage as it results in huge diversion of water into the upper Ganga canal. This leads to excessive in channel sedimentation in both upstream and downstream courses interrupting the natural channel equilibrium. As a result, the flow velocity is reduced in the lean periods with the reduction in monsoonal rainfall. The braided floodplain dynamics also gets altered as a result.  The Bhimgoda barrage diverts the the river water into the upper Ganga canal for hydroelectric power generation. Studies indicate that water velocity of river Ganga is about 1-1.9 m/s in the Haridwar region after the Bhimgoda barrage (Kumar et al., 2023).  There have been drastic changes in water discharge, sediment concentration and calculated sediment load before and after the construction of the Bhimgoda barrage. The water discharge was uninterrupted with high velocities (reaching up to 1.5-2 m/s), with massive flushes during monsoon. Post construction, this discharge has become fractioned upto 300-400 cumecs are permanently diverted out of the river into the canal system. Sediment concentration was highly variable before the construction (varying from <50 mg/l in winter to >2000 mg/l in monsoons). Post construction sediment concentration has become high upstream of the gates, heavily diluted getting finer downstream due to sediment trapping. The calculated sediment load used to pass uniformly downstream scaling up to 8 million tonnes/day across the upper Ganga. Post construction this has been disrupted, massive trapping upstream now leads to a drastically lower calculated sediment load footprint in the downstream riverine stretch.  Braiding index according to Brice has been calculated for this stretch for the years 1916,1972,2005 and 2026. The braiding index in 1916 was 7.347, for 1972 it was 6.76, in 2005 it was 5.4779 and in 2026 it increased to 6.26.                                                                           Fig 1: Location of Bhimgoda barrage and change in braiding immediately upstream and downstream of the barrage (1916,1972,2005,2025)        Source: SurveyofIndia toposheets 53K/1 and Google Earth Imagery)  Photo 1: Braiding and bar formation in the vicinity of Bhimgoda barrage (Dutta, 2001)  Fig 1: Changes in braiding at Haridwar, with location of Bhimgoda barrage (1916,1972,2005,2025 – Source: Survey of India toposheets 53K/1 and Google Earth Imagery)  Increase in braiding index indicates that a river is shifting from a single channel into a more complicated network of multiple branching channels which rejoin each other and are separated by islands or sandbars. Often this indicates higher sediment loads, unstable banks and changing water flows. There is also more fluctuation of discharge. Factors like flatter slope leads to a velocity drop, initiating sediment deposition and weak riverbanks which can collapse easily widening the active channel belt. Increase in stream power can also cause increasing braids. Anthropic interference in the form of river engineering works thus often lead to modifications in fluvial dynamics interrupting the morphologic equilibrium of rivers.  References:  Dutta R.K. (2017): Controlling Factors of Channel Shifting and Avulsion in Haridwar District, Uttarakhand Geographical Review of India 79(2) June 2017, 153-167 Kumar D, Kumar A, Malik D.S., Sharma R and Gupta V (2023): Effect of Barrages and Anthropogenic Activities on Ecological Integrity of the Ganga River: A Review on  Current Issues and Restoration Efforts AgroEnvironmental Sustainability, 2023, 1(1), 67-75 https://doi.org/10.00000/s2023010109  Shukla, U. K., Singh, I. B., Sharma, M., & Sharma, S. (2001). A model of alluvial megafan sedimentation: Ganga Megafan. Sedimentary Geology, 14, 243–262. Singh, M., & Singh, I. B. (1992). The Ganga River Valley: Alluvial valley in an active foreland basin. In 29th International Geological Conference, Kyoto, 2 (p. 30). Japan. Valdiya K.S. (2003): Reactivation of Himalayan Frontal Fault, Current Science, 85(7), 2001 1031-1040. ABOUT AUTHOR  Dr Karabi Das, Masters in Geography from University of Calcutta, former Senior Research Fellow, UGC, PhD on Physical and Socioeconomic changes in the Indian Sundarban is presently working as Assistant Professor of Geography, Dr Kanailal Bhattacharyya College, Howrah.She has participated in many national and international seminars and has 12 papers and 10 book chapters to her credit.Her areas of interest include Fluvial Geomorphology, river in equilibrium and human environment relationship. ...Read more

09 Sep 2026

Pune’s ambitious riverfront project is facing questions over flood safety, shrinking river space, ecological damage, sewage treatment and climate resilience, with SANDRP warning that a project meant to rejuvenate the Mula-Mutha could instead increase the city’s vulnerability. SummaryPune’s River Front Development (RFD) project is being questioned by environmental researchers and urban-planning experts over its flood calculations, ecological impact and compliance with existing regulations. A technical presentation by architect and riverfront researcher Sarang Yadwadkar, discussed by SANDRP, examines the project’s Detailed Project Report, government correspondence, Water Resources Department guidelines and environmental-clearance conditions. The analysis raises five central questions: whether the flood values are accurate, whether the river’s cross-section will be maintained, whether the effect of river confluences has been considered, whether climate change has been factored into planning, and whether Indian standards for river embankments are being followed. Concerns also extend beyond flood risk to the loss of riparian vegetation, inadequate sewage treatment and the construction of structures within the riverbed. With the project already substantially advanced, the debate is increasingly about whether Pune is creating a safer riverfront or altering the river in ways that could worsen future flood and ecological risks.  KeywordsPune riverfront project, Mula-Mutha river, Pune flood risk, riverfront development India, Pune river ecology, flood safety, climate resilience, river conservation, riparian forests, sewage treatment Pune, urban river management, environmental impact, sustainable urban development, riverbed construction, Maharashtra environment, SANDRP analysis, environmental governance, floodplain protection Is Pune building a riverfront or increasing the river’s risks? Pune’s River Front Development project has been presented as an effort to transform and rejuvenate stretches of the Mula-Mutha river system. The project, designed by HCP Design, Planning and Management Pvt. Ltd., has also drawn comparisons with the Sabarmati Riverfront project in Ahmedabad. SANDRP notes that the two river systems have substantially different landscapes and hydrological conditions, raising questions about whether a similar model can safely be applied to Pune.  The technical analysis highlighted by SANDRP focuses particularly on the project's stated objective of reducing flood risk. It examines the seven upstream dams, the three major river confluences within Pune and the flood-discharge figures used in the project planning. 1. Are the flood values being used correctly? One of the most significant concerns relates to the flood values used to design the riverfront. According to the SANDRP analysis, the flood figures used in the RFD project differ substantially from figures provided by Maharashtra’s Water Resources Department. At the Mula-Mutha confluence, the RFD project reportedly uses a 100-year flood discharge of 4,760.89 cubic metres per second, while the WRD figure cited by SANDRP is 12,868.80 cubic metres per second.  The analysis argues that the project calculations do not adequately account for water released from all seven upstream dams as well as runoff from the free catchment area between the dams and Pune. Another concern is the confluence or backwater effect. When rivers meet, changes in flow and water levels can cause water to back up upstream. SANDRP says Maharashtra WRD guidelines require this effect to be considered when flood lines are determined. The analysis therefore concludes that the flood values used in the project may be significantly underestimated. 2. Will the river’s natural cross-section be maintained? The second question concerns the amount of space being left for the river itself. SANDRP's analysis points to project documents indicating changes to the river's cross-section as a result of the proposed riverfront structures and land works. It argues that reducing the available river section can have consequences during extreme flows, particularly when the city is already facing intense rainfall events. The analysis also refers to correspondence between the Pune Municipal Corporation and the Water Resources Department concerning changes to the river's cross-section. According to the presentation, these changes raise questions about whether the project complies with conditions attached to its environmental clearance and WRD guidelines.  3. Has the confluence effect been considered? The Mula-Mutha system is not simply one uninterrupted river channel. Multiple rivers meet within Pune, making the behaviour of water during extreme rainfall more complicated. SANDRP's analysis argues that the project’s flood modelling does not adequately account for these confluence effects. This matters because water moving through a river can slow or back up when it encounters another high-flow channel. During a cloudburst or major rainfall event, simultaneous releases from upstream dams could send large quantities of water towards the city within a relatively short period. The analysis therefore questions whether the project's flood calculations accurately represent what could happen during an extreme event.  4. Where is climate change in the planning? Climate change is another major concern raised by the analysis. A Maharashtra government climate assessment prepared by TERI in 2014 projected changes in rainfall patterns, including increased rainfall intensity alongside changes in the number of rainy days. SANDRP argues that such climate projections do not appear to have been adequately incorporated into the RFD's planning and flood assessment.  This becomes particularly important as Pune experiences increasingly intense rainfall events. Infrastructure designed around historical rainfall patterns may face higher risks if future rainfall becomes more extreme. For a project costing thousands of crores, the analysis argues, climate resilience should be a central part of the design rather than an afterthought. 5. Are Indian standards for river embankments being followed? The fifth question concerns the location and design of embankments. Indian standards for river embankments recommend aligning such structures with the natural banks of rivers. SANDRP's analysis argues that parts of the Pune project instead place embankments further into the riverbed. The presentation also highlights construction and debris dumping within the river area, including a road reportedly being built within the floodline. According to the analysis, information obtained through RTI indicated that the riverbed road did not have the necessary WRD clearance or studies from relevant technical agencies.  Flooding has already raised concerns The debate is not entirely theoretical. The SANDRP analysis refers to an August 2025 event when a flood level reportedly exceeded the threshold at which the riverfront was expected to remain safe. The presentation states that a discharge of 71,408 cubic feet per second resulted in flooding/submergence of parts of the riverfront, despite the project's stated threshold being considerably higher.  The analysis argues that additional construction within flood-prone areas could further restrict the river's natural capacity and potentially increase flood levels and their horizontal spread. The ecological cost Flood safety is only one side of the debate. SANDRP and environmental experts also raise concerns about the destruction of riparian forests and riverine habitats. These areas support native trees, natural vegetation, birds, aquatic organisms and the wider ecological connection between land and water.  The Pune Municipal Corporation has proposed planting around 45,000 trees, but environmentalists argue that plantations cannot simply replace naturally evolved riparian ecosystems. Jeevitnadi Foundation's Shailaja Deshpande, quoted by Counterview, argues that natural riparian species and ecosystems perform functions that conventional plantations cannot replicate, including supporting aquatic life and maintaining interconnected food chains.  A riverfront cannot be separated from sewage management Another contradiction highlighted in the Counterview report is the gap between the promise of a cleaner river and Pune's sewage-treatment capacity. The city reportedly generates around 1,634 MLD of sewage. Even after the JICA-supported sewage treatment programme is completed, Counterview reports that an estimated 629 MLD of untreated sewage could continue entering the rivers.  This raises a fundamental question: can a river be genuinely rejuvenated through landscaping and embankment construction if untreated sewage continues to enter the system? Environmentalists cited in the report have also questioned whether existing sewage-treatment plants are consistently meeting CPCB standards.  The Sabarmati comparison Ahmedabad's Sabarmati Riverfront has often been presented as an inspiration for Pune's project. But the comparison has also become controversial. Counterview notes that portions of the Sabarmati Riverfront were submerged during the monsoon, adding to questions about the suitability of replicating the model elsewhere. The SANDRP analysis argues that Pune's river basin has its own hydrological characteristics and should not simply be treated as another version of the Sabarmati.  Legal and procedural questions The project has also faced environmental and legal challenges. Counterview reports that the National Green Tribunal had previously directed the Pune Municipal Corporation to amend aspects of its environmental clearance and had halted tree-felling activity. An amended clearance issued in 2024 was subsequently challenged as well.  SANDRP's analysis further points to differences between the project's Detailed Project Report and Environment Impact Assessment, including differing descriptions of proposed changes to the riverbed.  What happens next? The project has already reached an advanced stage, with Counterview reporting that around 80% of the priority stretch has been completed and the estimated project cost at approximately ₹4,727 crore. The concern raised by SANDRP is therefore not simply whether Pune should have a riverfront. It is whether the remaining work can be reassessed against actual flood behaviour, ecological conditions, climate projections and regulatory requirements. The larger issue is whether urban river development should prioritise concrete embankments, roads and beautification, or whether the river's natural floodplain, riparian ecosystem and capacity to absorb extreme flows should remain central to planning. The SANDRP analysis ultimately calls for closer scrutiny of the project's flood calculations, environmental impacts and compliance with existing standards before further interventions alter the river irreversibly. SOURCES AND ABOUT AUTHOR Original analysis/presentation: Sarang Yadwadkar, Architect and member of the Planning Committee of the Development Plan of Pune City. Context and explanatory text: Tara Tanmayi S., SANDRP. (SANDRP) Courtesy: Counterview.net — “Riverfront or river death? SANDRP warns of ecosystem collapse.” Counterview.net article ...Read more

09 Sep 2026

SummaryIn an era when the world is perturbed with ecological flow of rivers and river health, man made lakes and natural rivers of Hyderabad are in deep crisis, gasping for breath. In the Anthropocene, maintaining health of the waterbodies seems to be a gruesome challenge. The article hereby takes up all these issues hoping for a better future.  KeywordsEnvironmental flow, health of river, Hyderabad, manmade lakes  Rivers and lakes of Hyderabad are facing severe ecological decline. The major lakes and rivers of Hyderabad and Secunderabad are now considered as poorly rated water quality basins and water flows. Highly polluted untreated sewage, millions of litres of waste are directly meeting the river stretch and urban lakes. Besides, unchecked chemical discharge from nearby manufacturing and industrial centres, dumping of construction debris, plastic waste, and uncontrolled encroachment have led to the degeneration of the river and water bodies of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.  The impact of the degeneration:  Oxygen depletion ------ very low DO, dissolved oxygen even drops down to 0.3mg/l as it is in Durgam Cheruvu ------------ Biologically dead water ------ considered lowest grade 'E quality ' as in Asanikunta and Sunam Cherevu ---- unfit for any public use or ecological use ------------ stagnant water --------- infamous breeding grounds of disease carrying mosquitoes.  Historical Musi River:  Once dynamic and wider, River Musi, a tributary of river Krishna, flows right past the Southern edge of Osmania General Hospital. The river Musi in Hyderabad is heavily polluted with millions of litres of daily untreated domestic sewage, toxic industrial and pharmaceutical waste. Besides urban encroachment and loss of wetlands due to urban expansion have led to the shrinkage of natural water flow and natural vegetation cover.  As per archaeological evidences the oldest settlement on the Musi River bank date back to the 5th century, when Vishnu Kundinis built their capital to the south bank of the river at Indrapalanagar. But the power centres on the Musi River moved westwards to the interior parts of Telengana. The famous Golconda fort is on the north bank of the river.  Musi, popularly known Machukunda, is a major tributary of the Krishna River in Telangana, India. It is flowing through the heart of the Hyderabad city separating old city from the modern urban settlement. It originates from the hill Avantagiri and flows about 250 km before merging with the Krishna River at Vedapalli. Musi is formed by the convergence of two small rivers, the Esi and the Musa. In the late 16th century, Muhammad Quil Qutb Shah found Hyderabad on the banks of Musi River for the expansion of settlement beyond the crowded Golconda fort. A bridge named Purana Pul (old bridge) was constructed in the late 16th century to connect the capital of Golconda.  Even in the 19th century, Musi was a wide, dynamic and ecologically vibrant river. The banks and the ghats of the river Musi experienced many cultural activities of the settlements along the river. The river was then associated with green spaces, temples, washing ghats and grand palaces belonging to the Nizams. People of the nearby settlements used daily for fishing, farming, rituals and drinking water needs.  Bathukamme:  It is a vibrant nine -day floral festival celebrated by the women in Telengana to honour Goddess Gauri and worship nature. Women gather in circles around floral arrangement clapping rhythmically and singing traditional folk songs. Then the Bathukamma, the floral arrangements looking like a conical hill of flowers are floated in water of river Musi. The festival marks praising womanhood, life and nature.  Muharram:  The river Musi served as the traditional culminating point for processions with ceremonial alams. These are brought to the waterfront, sometimes alams are immersed in the river. An alam is crescent - and - star shaped decorative metal ornaments capping a mosque’s dome or minaret. Shia Muslims carry the alams, which represent justice, sacrifice, and the eternal victory of truth over tyranny.  Livelihoods:  Generation after generation washer folks (Dhobis) utilised traditional ghats of the river Musi for community trade and daily urban life. Fig 1: Two stretches of Musi River, 1975 (Source: Survey of India Toposheet no 56K/7, 56K/11)  Fig 2: Musi River, 2026 (Source: Google Earth Image)    Photo 1: Musi river in 2026 (Photo credit: author)  What is the present scenario?  1.  Now the river is reduced to a mostly dry or sluggish water flow within the city. The flow of the river Musi is now being controlled by building two reservoirs named Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar. The reservoirs were designed for drinking water and flood control.  2. The downstream section of the river has deteriorated from a historic water lifeline to ecologically dead water flow. About 1,00,000 residents across at least 30 downstream villages are highly affected by the polluted stretch of the river.  3.Recent environmental studies indicate that the Musi is one of the most pharmaceutical contaminated rivers. Massive volumes of dumped pain killers, antibiotics and cardiac medicine have created a major global hotspot for drug - resistant bacteria. This has caused loss of efficacy of common medical treatments for the locals.  4. Downstream communities are experiencing severe chronic illness, high rate of kidney disease, skin allergies, stomach infections and various types of cancers, food chain contamination.  5. Over 1.5 lakh acres of agricultural land use this toxic water for the production of crops like cotton, vegetables and paddy. Heavy metals like lead, nickel and chromium are abundantly present in soil, crops, vegetables and local fish. Toxic substances are returning to the plates of Hyderabad residents.  6. Shallow borewells and open wells in the villages along the Musi River are drawing highly saline and contaminated water unfit for consumption as toxic substances reach the local ground water table.  What are the measures taken by the Telengana Government?  The Government of Telengana established Musi River Rejuvenation Project, MRRP. The State Cabinet formally approved 7,345 crore rupees for the execution of core phase 1.  1.Phase 1 execution plan includes on ground cleaning and restoration across a 21 km priority corridor stretching from the Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar catchment down to Bapu ghat.  2. Sewage Treatment Plants, STP’s, are installed across Hyderabad suburbs. Daily 1,500 million litres of waste water are treated in the plants.  3. Social Rehabilitation: The Government approved allotment of 15,000 double bed room along with financial compensation for legally titled property owners.  4. Urban land and buffer zoning: Boundary along the riverbeds is enforced to clear illegal dump yards and to stop further encroachment of the areas adjacent to riverbed.  Community participation and citizens’ movement:  1. Musi Jan Andolan, MJA, an independent non - political platform-initiated movement to safeguard the Musi River and protect the thousands of families living along the river.  MJA highlights that over 36% of the total project budget is allocated for concrete heavy infrastructure, multi lane roads, bridges, toe walls and retaining walls.  MJA demands tree plantation all along the stretch of the riverbank. The organisation warns that replacing natural river banks with the concrete creates urban heat island effect. Again, it will destroy native vegetation and prevent natural ground water recharge.  2. Community participation in cleaning the river is urgently necessary. The residents of the Hyderabad and Secunderabad should be aware of the result of the death of a once wide and dynamic river like Musi.  The residents should play active role against the dumping of the toxic substances along the riverbank. The pharmaceutical waste must be collected from the hospitals regularly by the concerned authority and the community participation is needed to monitor the matter.  Contaminated and untreated waste water from the houses of the municipal wards should be treated in the treatment plants before mixing with the river water.  Traditional festivals along the river Musi must be restored so that the people can play active role in protecting the river from drying.  RK Puram lake:  The Ramkrishna Puram Lake (RK Puram Lake), originally Mukidigan Cherevu, was constructed by the Nizam in 1798. It was once a massive 100 -acre water reservoir to support the growing Secunderabad cantonment area. The lake was clean up to 1960 and the lake served as a major drinking water source for nearby villages and colonies. It was famous nesting place of migratory birds. Now the lake area came down from 100 acres to only 40 acres. After 1960 following the establishment of public sector unit and housing society the lake became the site of domestic sewage and garbage.  Ramkrishna Puram lake in Hyderabad faces severe degeneration due to unchecked sewage inflows, garbage dumping and uncontrolled encroachment. Once the lake was a highly attractive and beautiful destination, now the urban settlements around the lake experience urban flooding during heavy rain almost every year. Once it was an important reservoir of flood waters.  Causes of degeneration:  1. Untreated domestic waste water are supplied to the lake for years. This had blocked the storm water channels.  2. Rapid urbanization around the lake, primarily due to the availability of water, had caused shrinkage of the lake bed areas.  3. Low lying residential colonies get regularly under water during monsoon. Again, during lean period heavy algae growth foster ideal breeding grounds for disease carrying mosquitoes.  4. Rapid urbanization around the lake and subsequent withdrawal of groundwater in huge amount made the situation worse. Groundwater depletion in and around the lake RK Puram is related to the expansion of urban settlements. Again, natural percolation of surface water during monsoon is being hindered due concrete surface area expansion.    Fig 3: RK Puram lake in 1978 and in 2026 (Source: Survey of India toposheet and Google Earth Image)  Photo 2: RK Puram lake in 2026 (Photo credit: author)  Initiatives to be taken:  1. Illegal constructions around the lake area should be stopped.  2. The lake must not be the natural dumping ground of the urban waste material  3. Regular monitoring of the change in areas of the water surface of the lake.  4. Change detection with the help of satellite images should be done time to time.  5. Seasonal water depth variations should be observed and the data must be restored for restoration of the lake.  6. Auditing inflow points and mapping all storm water drains ensuring rainwater inflow into the lake.  7. Construction debris and sediments should not be allowed to inflow with the rainwater during monsoon.  8. Stopping plastic and trash dumping which is reducing the water holding capacity of the lake.  9. To check the bank failures along the circular pathway for the walkers. Local people are of the opinion that the lake is also experiencing climate change impacts, mainly changing rainfall pattern of the region. In recent past the region experienced enough rainfall during monsoon. K. Shridhar, a local resident with his friends told that in their teens, before thirty years, they enjoyed swimming in the lake. This year also the region has experienced below normal rainfall.  Hossain Sagar:  Even the large Hossain Sagar in Hyderabad (spanning about 5.7sq km) is currently dealing with environmental challenges including high pollution, heavy algal bloom and foul odours. The Hossain Sagar Lake in Hyderabad was built in 1562 AD across the river Musi during the Qutb Shahi dynasty to meet the drinking water needs of the growing settlement outside Golconda fort. The lake was the primary drinking water source for Hyderabad as the lake physically separates the core of Hyderabad from Secunderabad.  It is now an important tourist destination of Telengana with its beautiful necklace roads and the statue of Lord Buddha on the Gibraltar Rock in the middle of the lake.  Fig 4: Hussain Sagar in 1975 and 2026 (Source: Survey of India toposheet and Google Earth Image)  Photo 3: Hussain Sagar in 2026 (Photo credit: author)  Major initiatives taken:  1.Multiple STPs are set up around the lake to check the mixing of untreated sewage inflows.  2.To check the mixing of dry weather sewage from feeder drains like Banjara nala, Picket nala and Balkapur nala diversion structures are constructed.  3. Constant removal activity of floating solid waste.  4. Hossain Sagar Lake and catchment Area Improvement Project was launched in 2006 to upgrade sewerage infrastructure and manage nutrients- rich sediments.  But the result of the initiatives is not satisfactory:  The STPs and interception and diversions systems are not capable to tackle the problem in eradicating the pollution of the lake.  National Green Tribunal, NGT, indicated that nearly 376. 5 million litres per day of waste is still entering the lake.  Balanagar industrial area is still supplying highly toxic chemicals through the Kukatpally nala.  Reports from CAG and the Pollution control Board stated that the lakes Dissolved oxygen, DO, level dropped down below 3 mg/l, while The Central Pollution Control Board recommends 6 mg/ l for a healthy water body.  Citizens Role:  1. Stop single use plastic  2. Segregate waste properly.  3. Traditional Plaster of Paris idols should be discarded, Eco-friendly clay idols for Ganesh chaturthi and Durga should be made, immersion of the idols should be stopped directly in Hossain Sagar, may be immersed in baby ponds.  4. Communities living along the Kukatpally nala should check the mixing of untreated waste by installing simple wire -mesh trash traps at the community drains.  5. Community participation will include vigilance and reporting and giving support by making local lake warrior groups.ABOUT AUTHOR Dr Kanailal DasMasters in Geography from University of Calcutta, former senior research fellow, CSIR, PhD on Vulnerability of Gosaba, Basanti, Sundarban from Vidyasagar University.He has participated in many national and international seminars and has papers and book chapters to his credit.     ...Read more

09 Sep 2026

India’s rural schools are not empty because families have stopped valuing education. They are losing relevance because the system has struggled to deliver learning, capable teachers, functional infrastructure and pathways to a changing world. As India looks towards 2030, rebuilding the rural government school must become a priority—not simply by adding infrastructure, but by restoring capability, dignity and trust. SummaryIndia’s rural government schools face a deeper crisis than declining enrolment: many are struggling to deliver foundational learning, adequate infrastructure, teacher availability and meaningful pathways for children. Despite near-universal enrolment among rural children, learning outcomes remain uneven, while teacher vacancies, single-teacher schools and infrastructure gaps continue to weaken the public-school experience. The challenge is not simply whether schools should remain open, but whether they can become relevant to the aspirations and realities of rural families. The article examines policy efforts under NEP 2020, NIPUN Bharat and the 2030 education agenda, alongside examples of communities and states rebuilding public-school capacity. It argues for stronger teachers, mastery-based learning, digital and AI literacy, nutrition, functional infrastructure, local skills and transparent community participation. By 2030, the real measure of success should be the capabilities and opportunities a rural school gives every child—not merely the number of schools or students on paper. KeywordsRural Education, Rural Schools, Government Schools, Education Reform, Rural India, NEP 2020, Foundational Learning, School Education, Teacher Shortage, Education 2030, Public Education, Education Equity, Digital Literacy, Community Participation, School Infrastructure Why rural India's government schools are losing relevance - and how to rebuild them by 2030 NEP 2020 promises children who can read, reason, create, code and choose a livelihood. In too many villages, the State still struggles to provide the teacher, toilet, meal and lesson needed to get there. The rural school is not redundant. Its delivery model is. The central question in rural Indian education is no longer whether children are enrolled. It is whether the school gives them enough power to read with understanding, handle numbers, communicate across languages, use digital tools safely, question an automated answer and imagine work beyond inherited occupations. Across large parts of the country, government schools remain present in official registers but absent from the future children are being prepared to enter.This is not a claim that every public school is failing, or that private schools are automatically better. Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and many individual schools elsewhere show that public education can be rigorous, humane and trusted. Nor is a merger always wrong: a school with five children, one exhausted teacher and no laboratory may need a stronger nearby hub. The harder point is that the average rural public-school design has drifted away from both family aspirations and India's own stated education policy. A school may become empty because families lost faith, and families may lose faith because the school became empty. That is a policy loop, not a verdict on the child.  Access has widened. Learning has not caught up. India has made a significant access achievement. ASER 2024 found that 98.1 per cent of rural children aged 6-14 were enrolled. Families have not rejected education; they have brought children to the school gate. The crisis begins after the gate. In 2024, only 23.4 per cent of Grade III children in government schools could read a Grade II-level text. By Grade V, the figure was 44.8 per cent in government schools, compared with 59.3 per cent in private schools. Only 27.6 per cent of Grade III government-school children could do a subtraction problem; just 30.7 per cent of all Grade V children could solve basic division, rising to 45.8 per cent in Grade VIII.The adolescent picture is more damaging. ASER's 2023 Beyond Basics survey of rural youth aged 14-18 found that only 43.3 per cent could correctly solve a three-digit-by-one-digit division problem. About one in four could not fluently read a Grade II-level text in the regional language. Only 57.3 per cent could read simple English sentences and, among those, 73.5 per cent could explain their meaning. Digital access is also being mistaken for digital capability: 82.2 per cent of 14-16-year-olds knew how to use a smartphone, but only 57 per cent had used one for education in the previous week, while 76 per cent had used one for social media. A young person may navigate a video feed and still be unable to verify a source, fill an online form, protect a password, read a spreadsheet or question an AI answer.The Karnataka evidence cited in the accompanying Counterview report is a warning even in a state associated with technology. Across a 30-district study, 32.7 per cent of Grade I children could not recognise letters, 39.8 per cent could not read words and only about 34 per cent of Grade V children could read at Grade II level. The report also points to roughly 43,000 teacher vacancies and more than 6,150 single-teacher schools. The problem is therefore not only the number of posts. A teacher who has not been prepared for early reading, level-based instruction, practical mathematics, multilingual pedagogy, digital safety or AI ethics cannot acquire those capacities merely because a new online module has been uploaded.  NEP 2020 is written in the future tense. The National Education Policy 2020 imagines a 5+3+3+4 structure, foundational literacy and numeracy, early learning in the home or local language, less rote learning, competency-based assessment, subject flexibility, arts and physical education, vocational exposure from the middle grades, digital learning, inclusion, school complexes and stronger teachers. It expects a learner who can think, communicate, collaborate, solve problems and continue learning. NIPUN Bharat turned the foundational promise into a national mission, with Grade III as the target for basic reading, writing and numeracy. That 2025 deadline has passed, while the learning gap remains.The distance between policy and classroom is not a philosophical disagreement. It is a supply-chain failure. NEP needs time, subject teachers, school leadership, libraries, laboratories, transport, technology, health support and a professional culture that protects teaching. Rural schools too often receive the curriculum as a PDF and reform as a compliance form. They are asked to teach English, mathematics, digital skills and now AI literacy without the staff, equipment and training needed to do so. NEP also refuses the old academic-vocational hierarchy: a rural child should be able to learn algebra and understand a water pump, English and food processing, science and the local craft economy. Too many schools currently provide neither strong foundations nor credible practical pathways.  NITI Aayog's mirror: a chain of small failures. NITI Aayog's May 2026 report, School Education System in India: Temporal Analysis and Policy Roadmap for Quality Enhancement, draws on UDISE+ data from 2014-15 to 2024-25, PARAKH 2024, National Achievement Survey evidence and ASER 2024. Its central value is that it does not reduce the crisis to one statistic. India now has about 14.71 lakh schools serving more than 24.69 crore students, and primary access is close to universal, but higher-secondary gross enrolment is only 58.4 per cent. Government schools' share of enrolment fell from 54.3 per cent to 49.25 per cent over the decade, while private unaided schools rose from 31.7 per cent to 38.8 per cent. The shift reflects demography, migration, consolidation, data cleaning and family choice, but it also signals a weakening public contract.More than one-third of schools have fewer than 50 students. NITI records 1,04,125 single-teacher schools serving 33,76,769 pupils. A national pupil-teacher ratio can therefore look comfortable while a remote teacher is handling several grades, records, meals and surveys. Secondary dropout stood at 11.5 per cent in 2024-25, driven by cost, distance, migration, early work, early marriage, weak foundations and the belief that more schooling will not change a family's income.Infrastructure has improved, but administrative availability is not daily functionality. Functional girls' toilets rose from 85.17 per cent in 2014-15 to a reported 94 per cent in 2024-25, yet 98,592 schools still lacked one; 61,540 had no usable toilet, 14,505 lacked functional drinking water and 59,829 lacked handwashing facilities. Electricity reached 91.9 per cent, but 1.19 lakh schools still lacked functional electricity. Computers were reported in 64.7 per cent of schools, internet in 63.5 per cent and smart classrooms in only 30.6 per cent. PARAKH 2024 showed a national Grade IX pattern of 54 per cent in language, 37 per cent in mathematics, 40 per cent in science and 40 per cent in social science. Inclusion is equally uneven: ramps were reported in 79.1 per cent of schools, while only 33.4 per cent had functional toilets for children with special needs.NITI's diagnosis forms a chain: fragmented schools make staffing difficult; weak staffing produces weak learning; weak learning pushes families towards private options or out of school; falling enrolment then justifies further consolidation. Its answer is connected school complexes, functional infrastructure, shared teachers and facilities, mastery-based pedagogy, welfare support, portable records for migrant children, local accountability, relevant vocational pathways and technology that serves judgement. Each recommendation needs an owner, deadline, public dashboard and consequence when the water, teacher or lesson does not arrive.  Ninety-four thousand doors and the danger of a spreadsheet solution. Between 2014-15 and 2024-25, the UDISE series shows government schools falling from 11.07 lakh to 10.13 lakh. Total school enrolment fell from 26.95 crore to 24.69 crore, while private schools rose broadly from 2.88 lakh to 3.39 lakh. The arithmetic is real, but the headline '94,000 schools closed' does not explain how many were merged, reclassified, cleaned from inactive records or genuinely shut. India has a falling fertility rate, migration and urbanisation. A smaller school-age population will eventually change the network. Yet demography cannot explain away the loss of trust if government schools were consistently useful, safe and aspirational.A well-funded composite school can offer subject teachers, a library, laboratory, sports, counselling and skills that a tiny single-teacher school cannot. But 'within five to ten kilometres' is not a neutral phrase in a mountain village, floodplain, forest or tribal settlement. It means a road, river, monsoon, unsafe stretch, missing bus and a parent who cannot leave work to escort a child. Girls and children with disabilities pay the highest price. Every merger must therefore be tested against travel time, safety, seasonal access, transport cost, attendance, learning and equity. Consolidation should be a service upgrade, never a budget cut or abandonment disguised as rationalisation.  Why families are voting with their feet. Parents do not need a national report to know that a child is behind. They see a paragraph copied without understanding, change counted incorrectly at a market stall, a teacher managing several grades and election duty, and a private school promising English, tests, uniforms, transport and a future. Even when a private school is not objectively stronger, it signals seriousness. The falling government share is not simply a story of affluent families leaving; it is the aspiration of small farmers, construction workers, migrants and landless labourers for children who can read a bank message, compare prices, understand a loan, use a government portal, speak to a customer, migrate safely or build a local enterprise.Quality must therefore mean visible powers: reading a medicine label, calculating a wage, writing an application, understanding a map, identifying a scam, repairing something, growing or selling something and finding the next course. The answer is not a coaching centre or an artificial English accent. It is strong foundations linked to real use: local-language learning, English as a bridge, mathematics through markets and farms, science through water and soil, digital skills through public services and livelihoods, and clear pathways to higher study, apprenticeships and enterprise. Trust returns through repeated visible acts - a clean toilet, a present teacher, a reliable meal, a child who reads better this month, and a parent who can see what the school received and spent.  When the camera enters the school. In August 2026, the youth movement known as the Cockroach Janata Party, or CJP, launched School Thik Karo - Fix the Schools. Its volunteers entered government schools, recorded conditions and published what they saw. The checklist was basic: drinking water and functional toilets; electricity and usable classrooms; boundary walls and campus safety; midday meals and teacher attendance. The visual force of the campaign mattered because a dashboard can say 'infrastructure available' while a phone video shows a broken roof, a clogged toilet, missing windows, children without benches or a class in a borrowed shed. Reports placed such exposures across Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Karnataka, Rajasthan and West Bengal. In Rajasthan, a school in Rampura Kanwarpura was reported to be functioning in a buffalo shed; later reports said the unsafe structure was demolished and a new building of about Rs 18 lakh announced.The campaign also showed how quickly school scrutiny becomes political conflict. In Bankura, West Bengal, CJP volunteer Abdul Hafeez reportedly suffered an attack along with his father, who died two days later from injuries, according to an Al Jazeera account; competing claims about political responsibility remain subject to due process. In Latur, Maharashtra, an FIR was reported against organiser Abhijeet Dipke and others after a teacher alleged unauthorised entry, filming, questioning of students and threats; CJP disputed the account. A Rajasthan team also reported an attack, while a Hingoli headmaster was reportedly suspended after complaints of intoxication and neglect. These allegations require investigation, not headline conviction.Government responses included reported restrictions in Rajasthan on outsider visits, photography, videography and interviews. Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis dismissed the campaign as a political programme and said most Zilla Parishad schools were good. CJP exposures are not a representative sample, cannot measure learning and cannot replace trained inspections or social audits. But they reveal an accountability weakness. The answer is neither mob inspection nor official secrecy: it is lawful citizen access, child protection, independent audits, transparent school-level records and consequences for failure. Most teachers work under difficult conditions and should not be collectively demonised. Yet a public school must not function as a head teacher's fiefdom.  Money is moving. Trust is not. The Union's 2026-27 budget places total Ministry of Education outlay at about Rs 1,39,289 crore, including roughly Rs 83,562 crore for school education. It lists Rs 42,100 crore for Samagra Shiksha, Rs 12,749.99 crore for PM POSHAN, Rs 7,500 crore for PM SHRI and Rs 3,200 crore for Atal Tinkering Labs. Rajasthan has budgeted Rs 550 crore to repair more than 2,500 schools, Rs 1,000 crore for 400 CM-RISE schools, AI learning labs in 1,000 schools and a School on Wheels in each district, alongside a reported larger infrastructure plan. West Bengal cleared an ADB-backed project of about Rs 2,349.78 crore for roughly 430-432 schools, including classrooms, laboratories, libraries, ramps, toilets, kitchens and teacher development.The scale is welcome, but a model school in a project boundary does not repair every small primary school outside it. NITI notes that public education spending has remained around four per cent of GDP in recent years and records 4.6 per cent in 2021, below the six per cent aspiration associated with the Kothari Commission and NEP 2020. The issue is not only to spend more. It is to weight money towards remoteness, poverty, tribal and migrant populations and disability; release it predictably; ring-fence maintenance; publish its use; and protect teachers from non-teaching work. The real budget test is not a sanctioned amount but a functional service in the village.  The exceptions expose the rule. Kotlapur in Karnataka shows that the public system can revive. Its government school had effectively shut down in 2008 as parents moved children to a nearby private school. When headmaster Dr Vijaya Kumar arrived in 2025, he painted walls, built a Kannada language laboratory and small library, went door-to-door, explained entitlements and rebuilt the school's social presence. The village contributed about Rs 65,000 for CCTV. A fixed deposit of Rs 1,000 a year was created for each Grade I child, to mature after 18 years. Uniforms, books, shoes, socks and eggs made the promise visible. By 2025-26, reported enrolment had reached 42 with four teachers, supported by a School Management Committee.Kotlapur proves both possibility and indictment. Leadership, parent partnership and a visibly better school can restore trust; it is unacceptable that ordinary functionality should depend on a heroic headmaster, donations and personal ingenuity. Kerala's public investment and foundational culture, Tamil Nadu's mother-tongue and welfare emphasis, Himachal Pradesh's access in difficult terrain, Punjab's recent learning gains and community-linked models in Nagaland offer mechanisms worth adapting. The aim is not to copy a state wholesale but to identify what worked and fund it until it becomes routine.The rural school should connect the village to itself and the world. District skill maps can link schools with ITIs, Krishi Vigyan Kendras, self-help groups, cooperatives and practitioners in agriculture, food processing, repair, craft, energy, health, climate, logistics, bookkeeping and digital services. A paid practitioner may mentor a 30-60-hour module, but the teacher must convert experience into language, mathematics, science, design and reflection. Measuring a field, calculating yield, writing an invoice, checking an online payment or verifying an AI answer makes English, mathematics, science, civics and AI literacy useful. Vocational learning must not become caste or class tracking; every module needs bridges to higher study, ITI, polytechnic, apprenticeship, university and enterprise. Five international reminders, not five imports.  China shows the strength and risk of consolidation: better-resourced rural centres, shared expertise, digital links and a nutrition programme reported to benefit more than 37 million students. India can borrow the network logic only with transport, boarding and family contact. South Africa funds poorer schools more through its quintile model and combines no-fee access with nutrition committees. Brazil links social protection to education, redistributes funding through Fundeb and directs at least 30 per cent of federal school-feeding resources to family farming - a cue for deeper local procurement under PM POSHAN.Indonesia's school operational assistance model shows the value of predictable, flexible funds for broken taps, learning materials and connectivity, paired with public ledgers and audits. Finland combines serious teacher preparation with free materials, a daily meal, welfare services and transport when the journey is long or dangerous. India cannot transplant these systems, but it can borrow their principles: weighted equity, local flexibility with transparency, respected teachers, early intervention and the removal of food, health, transport and safety barriers. Ten non-negotiables for a different rural school by 2030.  Functional school guarantee. Every government school should have safe classrooms, drinking water, separate usable toilets, handwashing, electricity, a kitchen, basic furniture, accessibility, a library corner, play space and a maintenance calendar. Dashboards must report monthly functionality, not one-time availability.Rural teacher guarantee. Where there are multiple grades, provide at least two trained primary teachers and named access through a school complex to mathematics, science, English, languages, arts, physical education and vocational learning. Fill vacancies, offer hardship incentives and protect instructional time.Mastery before promotion. Test reading, writing and numeracy at the start of every year, group support by learning level, provide stigma-free catch-up and continue foundational support after Grade III. Assessment must change teaching, not punish children.English and mathematics for use. Build bilingual English around markets, health, work, migration, public services and digital communication. Teach mathematics through money, measurement, time, data, estimation, geometry and reasoning before abstract procedures become meaningless.Human-centred digital and AI literacy. Put power, connectivity, shared devices, offline content and teacher preparation before smart-classroom branding. Teach source checking, privacy, cyber safety, bias, copyright and verification. Children must use tools without surrendering judgement.Consolidate resources without abandoning habitations. Approve mergers only after testing travel, safety, monsoon access, disability access, girls' safety, cost, attendance and learning. Provide buses, bicycles, escorts or hostels when a child must travel.A local multiple-skills curriculum. Offer 30-60-hour modules in agriculture, water, food, repair, craft, energy, health, digital services, climate and enterprise. Pay and train practitioners, award portable credits and keep every academic route open.Nutrition, health and dignity. Strengthen PM POSHAN kitchens, local procurement, menus and social audits. Link schools to health screening, menstrual hygiene, counselling, disability support, physical education and mental-health referral. Track meals served, not meals sanctioned.Open governance and safe scrutiny. Train School Management Committees, give them usable budgets and publish staffing, attendance, facilities, meals, grants, repairs and learning progress without exposing children. Provide lawful observation and protected complaint channels.Weighted finance, leadership and proof. Fund remote, poor, tribal, migrant and disability-heavy schools more per child; release maintenance money predictably; train head teachers as instructional leaders; and publish a rural scorecard based on what children can do, not only what schools possess.  The 2030 test is brutally simple. By 2030, India should answer a child's question without hiding behind enrolment. Can she read a new text and explain it? Can he divide, estimate, measure and reason? Can they use English and a device to learn without losing the strength of their home language? Can they ask whether an AI answer is true, fair and safe? Can they learn a local skill without being sentenced to a caste or occupation? Can they stay through adolescence because transport, food, toilets, health and hope are present?A private tuition market can sell English, a phone can deliver a video and a skill centre can teach a machine. Only a strong public school can combine knowledge, citizenship, nutrition, dignity, peer life, local belonging and a route to the wider world for every child, including the child whose parents cannot pay. The problem is not that rural India has too many public schools. It is that too many have been left with too little capability to justify the faith placed in them. Closing a school may reduce an administrative line; rebuilding it can change a family's trajectory. Kotlapur shows the possible future, CJP shows the cost of leaving the present untouched, and NITI provides the architecture. The remaining requirement is political courage: let citizens see, make teachers capable and respected, fund the last mile and judge the system by the power it gives a child. #RuralEducation, #GovernmentSchools, #EducationInIndia, #RuralIndia, #EducationReform, #NEP2020, #NIPUNBharat, #FoundationalLearning, #EducationEquity, #DigitalLiteracy, #AILiteracy, #VocationalEducation, #PublicEducation, #SchoolInfrastructure, #TeacherShortage, #Education2030, #InclusiveEducation, #CommunityEngagement, #SocialImpact, #SustainableDevelopment ...Read more

08 Sep 2026

Climate justice cannot be separated from workers’ rights. As decarbonisation, climate change and digitalisation reshape jobs and industries, a truly sustainable transition must protect livelihoods, strengthen social dialogue and ensure decent, inclusive work. SummaryThe climate crisis is already reshaping workplaces through extreme heat, disasters, job losses and disruptions across industries, particularly in the Global South. At the same time, the shift away from fossil fuels, alongside digitalisation and automation, is changing both the number and nature of jobs, creating new challenges for workers and trade unions. The article argues that treating environmental goals and workers’ rights as separate issues creates a false conflict between jobs and climate action. A Just Transition must instead place workers and affected communities at the centre through collective bargaining, social dialogue, social protection, reskilling and gender equality. Examples such as heat agreements in Cambodia and worker-focused planning around offshore wind demonstrate how climate action and livelihood protection can work together. Ultimately, integrating labour and environmental governance is essential to ensure that the transition is not merely green, but genuinely just and inclusive. The climate crisis is no longer a distant threat. It is changing the world of work in real time - reshaping economies and workplaces. Heatwaves, floods, storms are disrupting work and industries, while entire communities tied to fossil fuel industries face decline as economies decarbonise. Countries in the global south are more prone to climate change induced disasters¹ and as such industries and workers here are more affected than others. Heavy flooding seriously affected industrial production in many Asian countries including 0Bangladesh, parts of Pakistan and India, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and China in 2023-24, particularly in the garment sector². This led to job losses as well as loss of wages for several hundreds of workers, a large number of whom are women. Heat stress is affecting workers at an unprecedented level. A 2024 report of the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2024)³ estimated that 18,970 deaths and 22.85 million occupational injuries were attributable to excessive heat every year, with about 71% of the global workforce being exposed to excessive heat. Workers working outdoors in agriculture, construction, transport etc., bear the brunt of the heat as do workers in poorly ventilated workplaces such as foundries or even garment factories. Climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts are therefore necessary and the need is immediate, all the more so as the interests of working people are aligned with the success of climate change mitigation strategies. Governments are in the process of implementing policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and move away from fossil fuels. However, the movement from fossil fuel to renewable energy has meant loss of jobs, in sectors such as coal and oil and increased informalisation of jobs that used to be permanent jobs. Job losses, especially in unionised sectors have made trade unions wary of climate change mitigation measures. Renewable energy such as solar and wind power energy, is gaining traction, even as coal is continued to be used. China, USA and India are among the top ten solar and wind energy producing countries. They are also among the top ten coal producing countries with China and India leading. Which means that the top coal producing countries are building the resources to produce more renewable energy. But, the number of jobs in these sectors is estimated to be far less than in the traditional energy sectors such as coal and oil. Most of the jobs are precarious, and are still non-unionised. For workers and unions, decarbonisation of the economy is an additional challenge as it has affected employment both in numbers and in nature. The logical sequitur is that workers’ rights should be considered central to climate change governance – both adaptation and mitigation strategies, as workers’ jobs are being lost and as workers’ face extreme heat stress and other effects of climate change. However, this is not always the case. Compartmentalization of workers’ rights and climate justice Climate change is treated primarily as an environmental challenge, even though workers and people in general are affected by it. Climate governance frameworks, whether policy, law, or corporate guidelines, treat environmental goals as completely separate from workers’ rights. The recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a case in point. The ICJ issued a unanimous Advisory Opinion⁴ affirming governments’ binding obligations under international law to combat climate change through measures that limit greenhouse gas emissions and foster international cooperation, to achieve the objectives of their nationally determined contributions. Although the Court recognised the binding nature of the Paris Agreement⁵ alongside the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it notably omitted explicit reference to workers’ rights. The omission is significant because the Paris Agreement in its Preamble itself affirms “the imperative of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs”⁶. The ICJ’s opinion in omitting workers’ rights follows a trend in climate governance - compartmentalisation between labour rights and climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Government policies as well as guidelines of Intergovernmental organisations such as Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) follow the same trend. The Paris Agreement follows the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Guidelines⁷ for a ‘just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all’ which identified the importance of social dialogue, social protection, fundamental principles of rights at work and gender specific policies for achieving just transition. Just transition is broadly understood to mean promoting environmentally sustainable economies in a way that is fair and inclusive to everyone concerned – workers, enterprises and communities – by creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind. However, government policy frameworks for climate change mitigation which are formulated as a consequence of governments’ obligations under the Paris Agreement are drawn up with little or no inputs from trade unions. In Chile, which has taken its climate change mitigation obligations seriously, it needed a Supreme Court judgement to ensure consultation with affected workers in the closure of a coal powered thermo electric power plant. In the case of Company Workers Union of Maritima Commercial Somarco Ltd. and others vs. Ministry of Energy⁸, the obligation of governments to ensure just transition was recognised by the Supreme Court. It was held that agreements adopted by the State of Chile to achieve carbon neutrality require a just transition strategy both for the workers harmed by the loss of their direct and indirect source of employment and for the communities affected by the loss of services linked to the development of the declining thermoelectric activity. The ruling ordered the government authorities to implement a plan for the workers affected by the decarbonization process, consulting them in that process. The 2023 update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct⁹ includes ‘recommendations for enterprises to align with internationally agreed goals on climate change and biodiversity’ and ‘recommendations on how enterprises are expected to conduct due diligence on impacts and business relationships related to the use of their products and services’. The recommendations on climate change do not specifically mention workers’ rights except in the context of training in environment, health and safety, and hazardous waste. This compartmentalisation is also seen in policy frameworks on human rights due diligence¹⁰, where climate change mitigation and adaptation has assumed greater importance. Most of these laws and guidelines have clauses on workers’ rights and environment/ climate issues, which remain isolated from each other. Labour rights and environmental standards are treated as being in separate silos. 1. Asia and the small island nations in the Pacific are affected more than Europe/ N America. See https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/climate-change-and-extreme-weather-impacts-hit-asia-hard .Since Asia is the hub of garment production, this industry was affected disproportionately in 2023-24. 2. ILO, The Heat is On: How heat stress impacts the apparel industry, jobs, and worker health, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025. 3. Flouris, A., Azzi, M., Graczyk, H., Nafradi, B., and Scott, N., eds. 2024. Heat at Work: Implications for Safety and Health. A Global Review of the Science, Policy and Practice. International Labour Office, Geneva, 2024. 4. Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) [2025] ICJ Rep. 5. The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It was adopted at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, France, on 12 December 2015 and entered into force on 4 November 2016. Its overarching goal is to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. See more here - https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf 6. Ibid. 7. International Labour Organization, Guidelines for a Just Transition towards Environmentally Sustainable Economies and Societies for All (ILO 2015). 8. https://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/company-workers-union-of-maritima-commercial-somarco-limited-and-others-with-ministry-of-energy 9. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (OECD 2023). 10. There is an increasing number of human rights due diligence (HRDD) law and policy frameworks such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, the German and French laws on corporate due diligence which are meant to deal with responsibilities of multinational corporations in their supply chains across the world. Decarbonisation and digitalisation: a double disruption This compartmentalisation risks creating a narrative that there is an apparent contradiction between measures to mitigate climate change and the rights of workers; that advancing climate justice would necessitate sacrificing secure employment or organised labour power. This is a wrong narrative. There is only one planet on which both jobs and the environment exist, and because there’s no economy, and no work, on a dead planet. The climate crisis has coincided with major advances in technology, and the world of work is facing challenges brought forth by decarbonisation and digitalisation. Workplaces are changing with the introduction of newer technologies both because of advances in technology and by the need to decarbonise the economy. The changes are far more rapid than we have seen in the past, and the effect is felt in several sectors. Technology change is not new. Technology has always changed the way industries function and therefore the way that workers have worked. The first three industrial revolutions changed manufacturing processes. The first industrial revolution transformed work with the advent of mechanization and steam power. This was also the era of child labour, forced labour and unsafe workplaces, and no workers’ rights. The second industrial revolution with greater use of electricity and mass production saw the beginnings of organized labour and trade unions across the world with workers’ rights being recognized, if not implemented everywhere. Labour laws which recognized workers’ rights, provided at least a way for trade unions to collectively bargain. The third industrial revolution with increased automation and the use of robots that changed the factory floor in a very visible manner. This phase also saw the beginnings of supply chains and weakening of workers’ rights. Trade unions were actively opposing the introduction of computers, but without much success. With the change in technology, the nature as well as number of jobs changed. In Industry 4.0 or the fourth industrial revolution which involves digitization and the deployment of cyber physical systems, the transition is in conjunction with greater automation. More sophisticated robots that require little to no human interaction are already in use in automotive factories. The automotive sector exemplifies this double disruption. The transition from internal combustion engines to electric vehicles is decarbonisation-driven. But it also coincides with automation, robotics, and digitalisation. Workers are losing jobs, the remaining jobs are changing¹¹ and companies want to rescind from their collective bargaining agreements, as in the case of Volkswagen in Europe.¹² Trade unions in Bosch in India report that new ‘high-tech’ units are being set up without consulting existing unions, employing qualified engineers and changing the nature of the job from blue collar to white collar¹³. Just Transition The Just Transition Guidelines of the ILO have as far back as 2015 articulated that sustainability and justice can and should go together. ILO’s Just Transition Guidelines identified the importance of social dialogue, social protection, fundamental principles of rights at work and gender specific policies for achieving just transition. An understanding of Just Transition and its principles is thus key to understanding that the binary of jobs versus environment is a false one. An effective implementation of the fundamental principles of rights at work particularly, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining will ensure the full participation of workers and their unions, taking into account their priorities. This would require employers/ companies to discuss with unions what changes are coming and how it would affect the workforce. It may mean that workers’ would need to be reskilled (to do a different job) or upskilled (e.g., acquiring new skills) as needed. Unions should be able to negotiate and collectively bargain work re-organisation. This underlines the importance of both collective bargaining and social dialogue, with a focus on unions being provided information by employers and governments about the impending and planned changes of work and work organisation in the workplace. The role of governments in ensuring that the ILO’s fundamental principles of rights at work¹⁴ becomes crucial. 11. The future of work in the automotive industry, Technical meeting on the future of work in the automotive industry (Geneva, 15–19 February 2021), Note on the proceedings, International Labour Office, Sectoral Policies Department, Geneva, ILO, 2021. 12. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cje9kv3q94po - Previously agreed wage increases were cancelled. An agreement between the company and the union was made for ‘cutting’ 35000 jobs by 2030. 13. Discussions with Bosch India unions in Pune and Bangalore (October – November 2022). 14. The ILO’s fundamental principles of rights at work do not require ratification of specific conventions. All countries are bound by the fundamental principles by virtue of their membership in the ILO. Making transitions ‘Just’ Trade unions are learning to deal with these challenges and are putting forward demands in order to protect workers from effects of climate change as well as digitalization. We are beginning to see examples of unions negotiating effects of climate change. The ‘Heat Agreements’ in garment factories in Cambodia¹⁵ is one such example. According to these agreements, which have been negotiated between unions and employers, if the temperature inside the factory rises above 35 C, cooling systems need to be turned on, and workers can take 5-10 minutes break. This is a very concrete example of collective bargaining being used to adapt to climate change. Another inspiring example is the successful campaign in Maine, USA where an offshore wind energy farm was built further away from the shore so that the livelihoods of the local fishing community could be protected¹⁶. This is a situation which could easily have been posited as workers vs. environmental groups vs. local communities. However, the importance of climate mitigation as well as the need to protect livelihoods were both prioritized and the wind farm was commissioned further away from the shore, while including collectively bargained wages for the workers employed on the wind farm. The importance of collective bargaining in protecting workers from the effects of climate change as well as the adaptation/ mitigation measures that governments are undertaking cannot be overstated. However, these examples are too few, with concrete clauses protecting workers’ rights, not very prevalent. The recent ILO Working paper on the role of collective bargaining on promoting just transitions¹⁷ (Schmidt and Braga, 2025) analyses 512 collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) to understand the presence and scope of clauses on Just Transition. While 58 of the agreements had clauses on just transition, most of them were declarative clauses and only 12 were more of a transformative nature. Topics in the agreements included hybrid work (aimed at reducing carbon footprint), working time organisation for extreme heat and upskilling of workers and managers. In addition, the Working Paper looked at six case studies in detail, outside of the 512 CBAs, and identified that the key topics were workers’ representation, planning for job changes and skill development, education and environmental management. These issues, particularly workers’ representation, planning for job changes and skill development are very much part of the Just Transition Guidelines. The ILO’s Just Transition guidelines are clear: climate adaptation and mitigation measures must go hand-in-hand with decent work, social dialogue, gender equality, and social protection. Just transition would mean promoting environmentally sustainable economies in a way that is fair and inclusive to everyone concerned – workers, enterprises and communities – by creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind. Done right, it’s a roadmap. There needs to be a renewed commitment to the ILO’s Just Transition Principles, particularly from employers and governments. Collective bargaining and social dialogue must be institutionalized with trade unions and affected communities being part of the drafting of climate strategies and plans. A robust social protection policy including health insurance, income support and retraining for workers is needed with the government playing a strong role, making sure that employers contribute their share. Just Transition would also mean that all workers are considered equal, for nothing can be ‘just’ without the element of gender justice. Women workers, who are typically not considered qualified for jobs that involve ‘high technology’ would need to be active participants. This requires a policy framework that includes work in the informal sectors, as well as low-waged manufacturing and services sectors where women are disproportionately concentrated. A Just Transition must dismantle these barriers, ensuring women access training and employment in green and digitalised economies. Without gender equity, no transition can be truly just. In addition, digital – driven technology requires extensive mining of minerals. This too needs to be approached within a framework of Just Transition, embedding workers’ rights and rights of communities into all policy decisions. 15. Heat Agreements in Cambodia: An interview with Somalay So and Joe Buckley, The Global Labour Rights Reporter, Vol. IV, Issue 1, 2025, p. 17-21. 16. Deedee Fitzpatrick and Hannah Sachs, “Labour leading on climate: advancing high-quality unions jobs in the emerging U.S. clean energy sector” in A Just Transition Law for Climate Justice, The Global Labour Rights Reporter, Vol. IV, Issue 1, 2025, pp 58-66. 17. Schmidt, V., Braga, C. The role of collective bargaining in promoting just transitions. ILO Working Paper 145. Geneva: International Labour International Labour Office, 2025. Conclusion How technology is applied and who benefits from it will determine whether the changes in the world of work is a Just Transition or only a green transition. The tools for a fairer future already exist in unions and in collective agreements. Integrating environmental and labour governance will materialise the idea that justice and sustainability can, and must, go hand in hand. References Flouris, A., Azzi, M., Graczyk, H., Nafradi, B., and Scott, N., eds. 2024. Heat at Work: Implications for Safety and Health. A Global Review of the Science, Policy and Practice. International Labour Office, Geneva, 2024.ILO, The Heat is On: How heat stress impacts the apparel industry, jobs, and worker health, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025.Deedee Fitzpatrick and Hannah Sachs, “Labour leading on climate: advancing high-quality unions jobs in the emerging U.S. clean energy sector” in A Just Transition Law for Climate Justice, The Global Labour Rights Reporter, Vol. IV, Issue 1, 2025 available here: The Global Labour Rights Reporter - ILAW Network.Schmidt, V., Braga, C. The role of collective bargaining in promoting just transitions. ILO Working Paper 145. Geneva: ILO Working Paper 145. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025.  ABOUT AUTHOR   Apoorva Kaiwar is a women’s and workers’ rights activist ...Read more

07 Sep 2026

India’s sugar market is facing a delicate balancing act as rising prices, duty-free imports and the rapid expansion of ethanol production put food security, farmer interests and energy goals in tension. SummaryIndia’s decision to allow duty-free imports of up to 10 lakh tonnes of raw sugar marks a major shift for a country that has traditionally been a large sugar producer and exporter. The move comes as domestic prices rise ahead of the festive season, with tighter stockholding limits also introduced to improve availability and curb hoarding. At the same time, India’s rapid expansion of ethanol blending has increased the use of sugarcane as an energy feedstock, raising questions about how the country can balance fuel production with domestic sugar requirements. The article highlights that ethanol is not solely responsible for rising sugar prices, with weather, rainfall, production, demand and stock levels also playing important roles. Climate vulnerability adds another layer, as sugarcane is water-intensive and increasingly exposed to changing rainfall and water availability. The way forward, the article argues, is not to choose between sugar and ethanol but to build a more flexible, climate-sensitive and diversified policy that can support both affordable food and sustainable fuel. For decades, India has occupied a dominant position in the global sugar economy. As one of the world's largest producers and consumers of sugar, the country has generally focused on managing domestic production, maintaining adequate stocks and, in favourable years, exporting surplus sugar. However, the recent decision of the Government of India to permit duty-free imports of 10 lakh tonnes, or one million tonnes, of raw sugar marks a significant policy development. The decision is particularly important because it represents India's first major move towards sugar imports in nearly a decade. The immediate reason for the intervention is clear: domestic sugar prices have risen sharply at a time when India is approaching the high-demand festive season. The government has therefore adopted a combination of measures, including tighter stockholding restrictions and duty-free imports, to increase availability and reduce speculative pressure in the market. However, the present situation raises a larger and more significant policy question. At a time when India has been rapidly expanding its Ethanol Blending Programme and encouraging the diversion of sugarcane-based feedstocks towards ethanol production, can the country simultaneously ensure sufficient sugar availability for domestic consumers? The decision to import sugar therefore reflects more than a temporary market intervention. It exposes an emerging tension between food availability, price stability, farmer interests and energy security. Why Is India Importing Sugar? The government's decision allows duty-free imports of up to one million tonnes of raw sugar until October 31, 2026. Normally, India imposes a high import duty on sugar, making the present zero-duty quota a significant departure from the usual policy approach. The objective is to improve domestic availability and moderate record-high prices before the period of increased festive consumption. The urgency of the situation is reflected in the other measures introduced by the government. Bulk consumers using more than 10 tonnes of sugar per month have been subjected to stricter inventory limits, with stockholding restricted to approximately 15 days' consumption during the specified period. These restrictions are intended to discourage excessive accumulation and prevent hoarding from aggravating the price rise.  The decision is also economically significant because India has historically been more closely associated with sugar exports than imports. The country's opening sugar stocks have declined considerably, while concerns over weather conditions in major sugarcane-producing regions have increased uncertainty about future production.  Thus, the import decision is essentially an attempt to address a simple but politically sensitive problem: when domestic supply becomes tight and prices rise, the burden is ultimately borne by consumers. The Festive Season and the Politics of Sugar Prices Sugar is not merely another agricultural commodity in India. It is a widely consumed household product and an essential ingredient for a large number of food-processing industries, confectionery businesses, beverage manufacturers and traditional sweet producers. Demand generally rises during the period between August and November because of major festivals and celebrations. This seasonal increase in consumption can intensify the effects of already limited supply. Reuters reported that the government considered several measures, including duty-free imports and tighter stock controls, as prices increased sharply ahead of the festive season.  The government's intervention therefore has an important consumer-protection dimension. Allowing additional sugar into the domestic market may increase supply and reduce the possibility that consumers will face even higher prices during a period of peak demand. At the same time, imports alone cannot solve the structural causes of supply pressure. If domestic production remains vulnerable to changing rainfall patterns, water availability and fluctuations in sugarcane output, India may continue to face periodic tensions between production, consumption and industrial demand. The Ethanol Blending Programme: A Major Policy Success with New Challenges India's Ethanol Blending Programme has been one of the country's major energy-policy initiatives. The programme aims to reduce dependence on imported crude oil, support cleaner fuel alternatives and create additional income opportunities within the agricultural economy. India's ethanol blending journey began with pilot initiatives in 2001 and gradually expanded through policy reforms and investment. The National Policy on Biofuels, introduced in 2018, played an important role in expanding the ecosystem for ethanol production.  The growth in ethanol blending has been particularly rapid in recent years. Government data shows that the blending percentage increased from approximately 8.1% in Ethanol Supply Year 2020–21 to 19.2% in 2024–25, while the programme reached the 20% level during the 2025–26 supply year period reported by the government.  The programme offers several important advantages. It can reduce dependence on imported petroleum, create a stable market for agricultural feedstocks, support rural investment and contribute to lower emissions. The government also argues that ethanol provides greater energy security by reducing India's exposure to fluctuations in international crude oil markets.  The Sugar-versus-Ethanol Dilemma The recent rise in sugar prices has brought this question into sharper focus. India was considering restricting the use of sugarcane for ethanol production in the upcoming season in order to increase sugar output and address concerns about tight domestic availability. This indicates that policymakers themselves recognise the possibility of a trade-off between the use of sugarcane resources for fuel production and the need to maintain sufficient sugar supplies.  This does not mean that ethanol production alone is responsible for the current increase in sugar prices. Such a conclusion would be overly simplistic. Weather conditions, rainfall shortages, expected production levels, domestic demand, market expectations and stock management can all influence sugar prices. Nevertheless, the situation demonstrates the difficulty of pursuing multiple policy objectives using the same agricultural resource. The Economic Impact of the Import Decision The immediate economic objective of the duty-free import decision is price stabilisation. Additional supplies can reduce scarcity and weaken speculative pressure in the domestic market. However, imports may also have consequences for domestic sugar mills and farmers. If imported sugar enters the market at a time when domestic producers are selling their stocks, lower prices could affect industry revenues. The government must therefore carefully manage the timing and quantity of imports. The current import quota of one million tonnes appears to represent an attempt to strike a balance rather than permanently open the domestic market to unrestricted imports. The policy is time-bound, with imports permitted until October 31, 2026.  The decision may also influence international sugar markets. Because of India's size and importance in the global sugar economy, a significant change in its import or export policy can affect global prices and trading expectations.  Climate Change and the Future of Sugarcane Production The current situation also highlights a broader concern: climate vulnerability. Sugarcane is a water-intensive crop, and production can be affected by changing rainfall patterns and water availability. Concerns regarding reduced rainfall in important sugar-producing regions have already contributed to uncertainty about future production.  In the future, India may face more frequent situations in which agricultural production is affected by climate variability. This creates a strong argument for diversifying ethanol feedstocks. Rather than depending excessively on sugarcane-based sources, India can continue expanding the use of alternative feedstocks such as maize, agricultural residues and other approved sources. The government's ethanol policy has already moved towards a broader feedstock ecosystem, reducing the need for ethanol expansion to depend entirely on sugarcane. A diversified ethanol strategy could help reduce the direct pressure on the sugar sector during years of lower production. Way Ahead India's decision to permit duty-free imports of 10 lakh tonnes of raw sugar is more than an emergency response to rising prices. It represents a significant moment in the evolution of India's agricultural, trade and energy policies. The immediate priority is understandably to increase supply and provide relief to consumers during a period of high demand. Tighter stockholding limits and temporary imports may help achieve this objective.  India's Ethanol Blending Programme remains an important achievement in the country's transition towards greater energy security. However, the recent sugar shortage demonstrates that ambitious fuel policies must remain responsive to agricultural production and consumer needs. The real challenge for India is therefore not to choose between sugar and ethanol. It is to create a policy framework capable of ensuring both affordable food and sustainable fuel. The recent import decision should thus be seen not as a policy failure, but as a warning that the next phase of India's sugar and ethanol strategy must be more flexible, climate-sensitive, data-driven and balanced. ABOUT AUTHOR Dr.S.Krishnan is an Academician and an Experienced Journalist in Jaipur.  Mr. Shasheesh Kumar Singh is a Phd Scholar, DAVV, Indore ...Read more

05 Sep 2026

Kolkata | 7 September, 2026 Satellites may be transforming life on Earth, but their afterlife is creating a problem above it. From Cosmoserve’s robotic debris-capture technology to SpaceX’s controlled de-orbiting strategy, new approaches are emerging to keep Earth’s orbital environment sustainable. SummarySpace is no longer an empty frontier. ESA's latest figures show that about 40,000 objects are being tracked in Earth’s orbit, including around 11,000 active payloads, while the actual population of smaller debris is far larger.Cosmoserve Space is approaching the problem from the removal side. Its Mission Embrace is testing soft robotic technology that could eventually help capture inactive satellites and other objects already stranded in the orbit. SpaceX, led by Elon Musk, is approaching it differently: Starlink satellites can adjust their orbits to avoid collisions and are designed to be deliberately de-orbited when they reach the end of their operational life. Keywordsspace debris, space junk, Starlink, SpaceX, Cosmoserve Space, active debris removal, orbital debris, space sustainability, satellite sustainability, satellite de-orbiting, orbital sustainability, space debris removal, Mission Embrace, collision avoidance, satellite disposal, sustainable space technology, Earth orbit, orbital environment, space environment, responsible satellite design The two approaches point to the same larger question: Can humanity keep using space without turning its most valuable orbital zones into a dumping ground? But why does space need cleaning in the first place?Every satellite sent into orbit serves a purpose, from communication and navigation to weather forecasting, Earth observation and scientific research. As our reliance on space-based infrastructure grows, so does the amount of hardware orbiting Earth. But when satellites stop functioning, they do not simply disappear and nor do the fragments left behind by previous launches, break-ups and collisions simply disappear. ESA’s 2025 Space Environment Report estimated that around 40,000 objects were being tracked in orbit, of which only about 11,000 were active payloads. The agency also warned that the debris population continues to grow rapidly. The growing number of objects in orbit is only part of the challenge. Their extraordinary speeds make collisions far more dangerous. A collision between two spacecraft or between a satellite and a piece of debris can produce additional fragments, creating new risks for other missions. Those fragments can then trigger further collisions, potentially multiplying the problem. That means orbital debris can continue to become a greater threat even without new satellites being launched.  What counts as space debris?Active satellites Inactive satellites  Rocket remnants Smaller fragmentsCollision-risk zoneSo, what is Cosmoserve actually trying to do?This is where Hyderabad-based Cosmoserve Space enters the picture.  The company is developing Active Debris Removal (ADR) technology, which goes beyond tracking orbital debris to physically capturing objects that are no longer useful. Its Mission Embrace focuses on a soft robotic capture mechanism. Rather than relying solely on conventional docking systems, the technology uses a robotic approach to capture objects in orbit. Cosmoserve has said it took the system from concept to flight-ready hardware in about four months.  But there is an important distinction.  Mission Embrace is a technology demonstration, not proof that Cosmoserve is already removing large quantities of debris from orbit. Its significance lies in testing a technology that could eventually support debris-removal and in-orbit servicing missions. That matters because capturing a defunct satellite is far more complicated than simply locating it.  A servicing spacecraft must identify its target, approach it safely and operate around an object that may no longer be able to communicate, control its movement or manoeuvre away from the approaching spacecraft.  Then what is Elon Musk’s SpaceX doing differently?  SpaceX has built one of the world’s largest satellite constellations through Starlink. As of 27 August 2026, 11,102 Starlink satellites had been launched, with 11,087 reported as operational, according to current tracking data. That scale brings a different sustainability challenge: what happens when thousands of satellites reach the end of their useful lives?  SpaceX’s approach is largely focused on prevention, manoeuvrability and controlled disposal. Starlink satellites are designed with propulsion and manoeuvring capabilities that allow them to adjust their orbits, avoid collisions and eventually descend into the atmosphere. SpaceX’s sustainability documentation states that satellites undergoing de-orbiting retain manoeuvrability and collision-avoidance capabilities during their descent. In 2026, SpaceX also began lowering the orbits of about 4,400 Starlink satellites from approximately 550 km to 480 km. The lower altitude is intended to reduce the amount of time satellites remain in orbit after their operational lives and, in turn, limit long-term debris and collision risks. COMPARISON INFOGRAPHIC  CosmoserveSpaceX / StarlinkDeveloping active debris removalFocuses on satellite life-cycle managementBuilds technology to capture objectsSatellites are designed to manoeuvreTargets inactive or stranded objectsControls its own satellitesSoft robotic capture is a key technologyControlled de-orbiting is a key strategyStill at the technology-development stageAlready operating at constellation scale So, can prevention alone solve the space-junk problem?That is where the difference between preventing new debris and removing existing debris becomes important. SpaceX’s approach can help ensure that its own satellites do not remain in orbit indefinitely after their mission end. But controlled de-orbiting addresses future disposal; it does not remove the older, inactive objects and fragments already circling Earth. That is the gap that active debris-removal companies are trying to address. The challenge is also becoming larger as more satellites are launched. Expanding satellite networks can bring greater connectivity, communication and other services, but they also add more traffic to already crowded orbital regions. In other words, keeping new debris from accumulating is only one part of the solution. The harder question is what to do with the debris that is already there. HOW DO WE KEEP SPACE CLEAN? Design better satellites↓Track objects in orbit↓Avoid collisions↓De-orbit satellites responsibly↓Remove dangerous existing debris Is cleaning space really about Cosmoserve versus Musk?Not quite. The bigger story is not a contest between Cosmoserve and SpaceX. It is whether the space industry can develop a system in which prevention and removal work together to keep Earth’s orbit usable. SpaceX demonstrates what large-scale satellite operators can do when collision avoidance, manoeuvrability and end-of-life disposal are built into a constellation from the beginning. Cosmoserve represents a different but increasingly important need: technology that can deal with objects already left inactive in orbit and potentially difficult to control or remove. Neither approach, on its own, solves the entire space-junk problem. As launches accelerate and more companies enter the space economy, orbital sustainability will depend on several layers working together: better satellite design, accurate tracking, collision avoidance, responsible end-of-life disposal and, where necessary, active removal of high-risk debris. That changes the question at the heart of the space race. It is no longer only about who can launch the most satellites, build the biggest constellation or reach orbit the fastest. It is about who takes responsibility for what happens after those satellites stop working. True space sustainability will not be measured by how much we put into orbit, but by how responsibly we manage what remains there.Primary sources: European Space Agency — Space Environment Report 2025 — Supports the orbital-debris figures, including ~40,000 tracked objects and ~11,000 active payloads, and the need for active debris removal.  ESA Space Debris Environment Statistics — Provides updated 2026 statistics on tracked objects, satellites, debris populations and orbital mass. SpaceX / Starlink — Commitment to Space Sustainability — Supports Starlink’s collision-avoidance, controlled de-orbiting and satellite sustainability approach. SpaceX — Approach to Space Sustainability and Safety — Supports information on satellite manoeuvrability, collision avoidance, low-altitude operation, controlled de-orbiting and design-for-demise.   Cosmoserve / Mission Embrace Cosmoserve Space — Official Website — Supports Cosmoserve’s Active Debris Removal technology, orbital-debris removal mission and its “Reviver”/“Mothercraft” concepts. The New Indian Express — Mission Embrace — Supports the Mission Embrace soft-robotic capture demonstration and its development timeline. Business Standard — Cosmoserve Mission Embrace — Provides additional reporting on the soft robotic capture mechanism and its role in Active Debris Removal. ...Read more

07 Sep 2026

India has an opportunity to move beyond attracting climate finance and help shape how Asia finances its climate transition. By combining its economic scale, financial innovation, clean-technology capabilities and regional partnerships, India can turn climate finance into a powerful engine for sustainable growth and resilience.SummaryIndia faces the dual challenge of sustaining economic growth while accelerating decarbonisation and adapting to intensifying climate risks.The article argues that this challenge also creates an opportunity for India to influence how climate finance is mobilised across emerging economies in Asia.India can lead through blended finance, guarantees, green bonds, South-South cooperation, climate-resilient infrastructure and clean-technology investment.However, financing gaps, high costs of capital, weak project bankability and fragmented institutional coordination remain significant barriers.The next step is to convert India’s domestic climate-finance experience into models that can be replicated through regional partnerships, technology sharing and stronger investment mechanisms.Ultimately, India can demonstrate that climate action and economic development are not competing goals, but can be integrated into a regional pathway for investment, innovation, resilience and sustainable growth.KeywordsIndia climate finance, Asia climate finance, climate finance architecture, climate investment India, climate finance leadership, sustainable finance India, green finance, climate investment Asia, blended finance, green bonds India, climate-resilient infrastructure, clean technology investment, South-South cooperation, climate finance mechanisms, renewable energy investment, green infrastructure, sustainable investment, climate resilience, ESG finance, India climate strategy, climate finance Global South, Asian climate transition, climate finance mobilization, sustainable growth, climate investment opportunitiesIndia stands at a critical point in its economic and climate transformation. As one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing major economies, the country must finance infrastructure, energy, industry, cities, and employment while responding to intensifying climate risks. Unlike many advanced economies, India must expand development and accelerate decarbonization at the same time.This creates an opportunity that extends beyond India’s national borders. How India mobilizes climate finance can influence how emerging economies across Asia finance clean energy, resilience, industrial transformation, and sustainable growth. The question is no longer simply how much climate finance India can attract, but whether India can help shape the financial architecture through which Asia’s climate transition will be financed.India therefore has an opportunity to move from being a major destination for climate investment to becoming a force in designing, mobilizing, and scaling climate finance across Asia.From Climate Commitments to Financial PowerThe Paris Agreement provides the global framework for climate action, but commitments alone cannot deliver transformation. Countries need capital to build renewable energy systems, modernize electricity grids, develop clean transportation, decarbonize industries, strengthen agriculture, protect natural resources, and adapt infrastructure to a changing climate.For India, this means translating climate ambition into financial and investment strategies. Climate policy cannot remain the responsibility of environmental institutions alone. It must increasingly be integrated into economic planning, financial regulation, infrastructure investment, industrial strategy, and private-sector decision-making.India’s contribution to global climate action can therefore extend beyond reducing the carbon intensity of its own economy. Its larger contribution could be demonstrating how a major developing economy can mobilize capital while pursuing economic growth, energy security, industrial development, and climate resilience.This is particularly important for the Global South. Many developing countries cannot simply replicate financing models from advanced economies. They need approaches that recognize higher financing costs, limited fiscal space, infrastructure deficits, and competing development priorities.India can help demonstrate that climate finance can become a development engine, rather than an additional constraint on development.Where India Can Lead Asia?India has several potential areas of regional leadership.The first is mobilizing private capital. Asia’s climate investment requirements cannot be met by government budgets or concessional finance alone. Public finance must increasingly reduce risk and unlock much larger pools of private capital.Blended finance, guarantees, green bonds, sustainability-linked instruments, concessional lending, and public-private partnerships can turn climate priorities into investable opportunities. India’s large domestic market provides an environment in which these mechanisms can be developed, tested, and scaled.The second opportunity is South-South cooperation. Asian developing economies often face similar challenges in accessing long-term and affordable capital. India can share experience in project preparation, financial innovation, policy development, institutional capacity, and technology deployment with countries seeking practical pathways for their own transitions.The third is climate-resilient infrastructure. Asia’s climate challenge is not limited to mitigation. Floods, droughts, heatwaves, cyclones, water stress, and other hazards increasingly threaten infrastructure, agriculture, cities, and supply chains. India can help promote financial models that integrate adaptation and resilience into mainstream infrastructure investment.The fourth is clean-technology investment. India’s growing capabilities in renewable energy, electric mobility, green hydrogen, digital technologies, and sustainable infrastructure can support regional technology partnerships and investment flows.India’s leadership opportunity therefore lies not in controlling Asia’s climate-finance system, but in building mechanisms that enable countries to mobilize capital, share technology, and accelerate implementation.India’s Climate Finance Drive: What Is Already Working?India’s climate-finance experience offers important lessons for other emerging economies.One is the integration of climate action with economic development. Renewable energy investment, for example, can simultaneously support emissions reduction, energy security, industrial development, employment, and reduced dependence on imported fuels. Climate investment thus becomes part of economic strategy rather than simply environmental expenditure.Another strength is scale. India’s large domestic market can create demand for clean technologies and provide investors with opportunities to develop projects and business models that can later be replicated elsewhere.India has also developed growing experience with sustainable financial instruments and institutional participation. Green bonds, sustainable finance initiatives, public-private investment structures, and greater involvement of financial institutions can channel capital toward climate-related activities. India is also advancing work on a national climate-finance taxonomy, strengthening the foundations for more consistent sustainable investment.The International Solar Alliance provides another important example. It demonstrates how India can use its domestic experience and diplomatic capacity to create platforms for international cooperation around a shared climate objective.India is also developing catalytic-finance approaches. The India Green Finance Facility, supported by the Asian Development Bank and Green Climate Fund, illustrates how multilateral finance can help mobilize investment for India’s clean-energy transition.These experiences point to a broader lesson: successful climate finance requires more than money. Policies, institutions, investment pipelines, technology, financial markets, and implementation capacity must work together.India’s opportunity is to turn this experience into models that can be adapted across Asia.The Barriers to India’s Climate Finance LeadershipIndia’s opportunity to lead should not be confused with automatic leadership. Several structural challenges must be addressed.The first is the financing gap. India’s climate transition requires investment at a scale that cannot be met by public resources alone. The country must therefore deepen its ability to mobilize institutional investors, commercial banks, corporations, international investors, and development finance.The second is the cost of capital. Climate infrastructure often requires large upfront investment and long repayment periods, while developing economies can face higher financing costs and currency risks. These conditions can reduce the attractiveness of otherwise viable projects.The third is project bankability. The challenge is not always a shortage of capital. It can also be a shortage of well-prepared projects that meet investors’ financial, technical, regulatory, and risk requirements. Stronger project preparation and risk-sharing mechanisms will therefore be essential.Institutional coordination is another challenge. Governments, regulators, banks, investors, corporations, development institutions, and technology providers must work toward coherent transition priorities rather than fragmented programs.India must also continue strengthening its domestic climate-finance architecture, including regulatory consistency, climate-related disclosure, financial-sector capacity, climate-risk assessment, and credible investment standards.The energy transition itself requires careful management. India must balance decarbonization with energy security, affordability, industrial competitiveness, and employment. Climate finance must also support workers and communities affected by economic transition.Finally, regional leadership requires more than domestic scale. India must develop cross-border cooperation, replicable investment models, shared standards, technology partnerships, and financial mechanisms that other Asian countries can actually use.These constraints do not diminish India’s opportunity. They define the leadership challenge.From National Drive to Asian LeadershipThe next stage of India’s climate-finance journey should be about converting national capability into regional influence.India can work with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, China, European partners, multilateral development banks, climate funds, institutional investors, and development agencies to strengthen investment connections across Asia. The objective should be practical: improve project preparation, reduce investment risks, expand access to capital, accelerate technology deployment, and strengthen climate resilience.Multilateral development banks can provide long-term finance, guarantees, technical assistance, and risk-sharing mechanisms. But their larger value lies in using development capital to mobilize substantially greater volumes of commercial investment.India can also develop investment models that other developing economies can adapt to their own circumstances. Its leadership will be stronger if its experience becomes transferable rather than remaining exclusively domestic.This is where India’s climate drive can become strategically important for Asia. India does not need to impose a single model. It can lead by demonstrating what works, sharing capabilities, convening partnerships, and building financial mechanisms that expand opportunity across the region.Other countries can learn from India that climate leadership does not require choosing between development and sustainability. It requires connecting climate objectives with energy security, industrial competitiveness, innovation, employment, investment, and resilience.For emerging economies, this may be India’s most valuable contribution: showing that climate action can be embedded within development strategy rather than treated as a separate environmental agenda.Conclusion: India’s Opportunity to Lead Asia’s Climate Finance ArchitectureAsia’s climate transition will require unprecedented investment, innovation, and cooperation. No country can finance this transformation alone. Yet some countries will have greater capacity to shape the systems through which that finance is mobilized.India is one of them.Its economic scale, growing financial ecosystem, clean-technology ambitions, large domestic market, institutional experience, and international partnerships provide a strong foundation for greater leadership.The opportunity now is to move beyond attracting climate finance toward shaping how climate finance works across Asia.If India can convert its scale and momentum into regional influence, its climate-finance journey can become more than a national development story. It can become a model for how emerging economies turn climate ambition into investment, innovation, resilience, and sustainable growth—and help build an Asian climate-finance architecture capable of financing the region’s next transformation.ABOUT AUTHORCHOEN KRAINARADr Choen Krainara is a Thailand-based sustainability strategist, specialising in climate policy, ESG and regional cooperation across Asia ...Read more

07 Sep 2026

Swami Vivekananda, Practical Vedanta and the Making of a Sustainable IndiaSwami Vivekananda never spoke the language of carbon budgets or net zero. Yet his most enduring ideas — on oneness, self-mastery, service, strength, education, science and renunciation — reach straight into the moral centre of the climate crisis. Read without anachronism, his Practical Vedanta offers India not a green slogan, but a demanding philosophy for prosperity without excess, spirituality without escape and development without abandonment of the vulnerable. Swami Vivekananda, Chicago-era portrait, 1893. Photograph: Thomas Harrison. AT A GLANCE BLURBSwami Vivekananda never spoke the language of carbon budgets or net zero. Yet his most enduring ideas — on oneness, self-mastery, service, strength, education, science and renunciation — reach straight into the moral centre of the climate crisis. Read without anachronism, his Practical Vedanta offers India not a green slogan, but a demanding philosophy for prosperity without excess, spirituality without escape and development without abandonment of the vulnerable. SUCCINCT SUMMARYVivekananda was not a climate theorist, and it would be historically false to make him one. His relevance is deeper. He asked India to combine spiritual confidence with scientific modernity, to conquer desire as seriously as it conquered external nature, to educate for character and capability, and to regard service to the least powerful as worship. In an era of warming, ecological disruption and hyper-consumption, these principles translate into climate justice, conscious consumption, resilient communities, ethical enterprise, green education and a daily discipline of restraint, health, attention and service. The sustainable India his thought can inspire is neither anti-development nor consumerist: it is technologically ambitious, socially just, ecologically responsible and inwardly free. “The national ideals of India are RENUNCIATION and SERVICE.”— Swami Vivekananda, Reawakening of Hinduism on a National Basis 2024India’s warmest year on record since 1901IMD2.8°CApprox. warming this century under current global policiesUNEP 202552.57%India’s installed power capacity from non-fossil sources as of 28 Feb 2026India NDC 2031–35 THE MONK WHO DID NOT PREDICT CLIMATE CHANGE — AND WHY THAT MATTERS Swami Vivekananda died in 1902. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the language of “net zero”, the IPCC, biodiversity conventions and the Sustainable Development Goals belonged to another century. Calling him a climate scientist in saffron robes would not honour him; it would flatten history. His importance to the ecological age is more serious than retrospective prophecy. Vivekananda asked what kind of human being a civilisation should produce. He asked what freedom means, what education is for, how strength should be used, whether privilege can coexist with spiritual truth, and why religion that does not enter the suffering world is incomplete. Those questions now sit underneath climate policy. Technology can tell us how to decarbonise electricity; it cannot, by itself, decide how much consumption is enough, whose livelihood must be protected in a transition, or what we owe generations we will never meet. India’s climate reality makes that moral layer impossible to ignore. The India Meteorological Department recorded 2024 as the country’s warmest year since nationwide records began in 1901, with annual mean land temperature 0.65°C above the 1991–2020 average. UNEP’s 2025 Emissions Gap Report says current global policies still point to roughly 2.8°C of warming this century. The ecological emergency is technical, economic and political — but it is also a crisis of consciousness, appetite and solidarity. “Each soul is potentially divine.”— Swami Vivekananda, Raja-Yoga, Preface THE FIRST GREEN REVOLUTION IS INSIDE THE MIND One of Vivekananda’s most useful distinctions for our century is between external nature and internal nature. Modern civilisation is astonishingly good at manipulating the external world: we split atoms, edit genes, automate factories, mine deep seas, launch satellites and train artificial intelligence. Yet the same civilisation often treats desire as sovereign. The market can optimise delivery in ten minutes; the mind has not learned to ask whether the purchase was necessary. Vivekananda put the hierarchy differently: “It is good and very grand to conquer external nature, but grander still to conquer our internal nature.” He was speaking about spiritual freedom, not carbon emissions. But the translation into sustainability is precise. External mastery plus internal unrestraint produces efficient excess. External mastery plus self-mastery can produce a civilisation capable of abundance without waste. The IPCC has given this insight a modern empirical edge: demand-side changes in buildings, transport and food, together with new ways of providing services, can reduce end-use-sector greenhouse-gas emissions by 40–70 per cent by 2050 relative to baseline scenarios. The point is not that individual virtue replaces public policy. It is that policy, infrastructure, business models and culture all shape demand — and none can ultimately avoid the question of “enough”. A Vivekanandan environmental ethic therefore rejects two equal mistakes: compulsory austerity for the poor, and limitless consumption for the rich. Renunciation is not romanticised deprivation. A child without cooling in deadly heat, a family without clean cooking, a village without reliable electricity or a woman walking kilometres for water needs more material security, not sermons on consuming less. Restraint becomes a moral obligation precisely where consumption has crossed from dignity into display, from comfort into compulsion. “It is good and very grand to conquer external nature, but grander still to conquer our internal nature.”— Swami Vivekananda, The Necessity of Religion ADVAITA MEETS ECOLOGY — WITHOUT CONFUSING METAPHYSICS WITH SCIENCE At the heart of Vivekananda’s Vedanta is unity: the same ultimate reality appears through multiplicity. “Each soul is potentially divine,” he wrote in the Preface to Raja-Yoga, while describing the spiritual task as mastering nature, external and internal. Modern ecology arrives at interdependence through a different road — observation, measurement, systems science. Soil, pollinators, water cycles, forests, oceans, microbes, farms and cities are linked in material feedback loops. Vedanta and ecology are not interchangeable disciplines. Yet they can reinforce the same ethical refusal of separateness. The ecological crisis thrives on distance. The city sees a plastic packet, not the petrochemical chain behind it. The smartphone user sees a device, not mines, metals, labour and e-waste. The electricity consumer sees a switch, not the land, water, ash, transmission lines or communities behind generation. The river becomes “water supply”; the forest becomes “stock”; the atmosphere becomes a free waste sink. Practical Vedanta collapses that moral distance. If dignity is universal and existence is radically connected, no community can be treated as an acceptable sacrifice zone. A wetland is not sacred because we romanticise it; it is indispensable because life is relational. A mangrove is storm protection, nursery habitat, carbon store and livelihood system at once. An ethic of oneness does not replace environmental-impact assessment. It tells us why the assessment must count lives that markets routinely discount. “It is good and very grand to conquer external nature, but grander still to conquer our internal nature.”— Swami Vivekananda, The Necessity of Religion FROM “LIVE FOR OTHERS” TO CLIMATE JUSTICE Vivekananda’s spirituality was never satisfied with private illumination. “They alone live who live for others,” he wrote; elsewhere, “It is a privilege to serve mankind, for this is the worship of God.” In the Ramakrishna movement, this became organised service — education, health, relief and rural work — rather than episodic charity. The Ramakrishna Mission, founded in 1897, turned the principle of Atmano mokshartham jagat hitaya cha — one’s own liberation and the welfare of the world — into institutional practice. Climate change makes this service ethic intensely contemporary because vulnerability is unequal. A wealthy household can buy air-conditioning, insurance, purified water and mobility. A street vendor loses income when heat becomes dangerous. A marginal farmer cannot diversify risk as easily as an agribusiness. A fisher family living beside an eroding coast cannot move assets with a click. Children lose school days after floods. Women often absorb extra care work and water stress. Informal settlements face heat, drainage and air-pollution burdens together. A Vivekanandan climate policy would therefore ask four uncomfortable questions: Who benefits? Who pays? Who decides? Who is invisible? The answers must shape a just transition from coal, climate-resilient housing, heat-action plans, public transport, forest governance, disaster response and adaptation finance. Tribal and local ecological knowledge should be engaged with respect and evidence, not appropriated as picturesque folklore; likewise, conservation must not become an excuse to dispossess people whose livelihoods have long depended on forests and commons. Service also changes the tone of philanthropy and CSR. A company cannot claim the spirit of seva because it plants trees with one hand while contaminating water with the other. ESG cannot remain a reporting layer detached from procurement, product design, labour conditions, logistics, biodiversity, executive incentives and capital allocation. Vivekananda’s assault on privilege is relevant here: sustainability is credible only when responsibility runs through the institution, not merely through its charitable arm. “They alone live who live for others, the rest are more dead than alive.”— Swami Vivekananda, Our Duty to the Masses RENUNCIATION FOR THE AGE OF ONE-CLICK CONSUMPTION “The national ideals of India are RENUNCIATION and SERVICE,” Vivekananda said. Renunciation, in his world, did not mean economic stagnation; he wanted the masses educated, technically capable and materially uplifted. Its contemporary ecological meaning is freedom from being possessed by possessions. That distinction matters in a consumer culture engineered around attention, novelty and replacement. Fast fashion makes garments psychologically old before they are physically worn out. Electronics are upgraded because status expires faster than hardware. Food is discarded while millions struggle with nutrition. Festivals can become competitions in lighting, plastic, thermocol, transport and noise. Digital platforms turn desire into a continuous auction for attention. The sustainable spiritual response is not joylessness. It is a richer definition of enjoyment: use without addiction; beauty without waste; celebration without toxicity; mobility without needless emissions; technology without servitude. Repair before replacing. Borrow or share where ownership adds little. Choose durability. Prefer local and seasonal food where practical. Reduce food waste. Carry a bottle. Refuse unnecessary packaging. Use public transport, walking or cycling when the urban system makes them safe. Let the festival leave memories, not mountains of refuse. This is where Vivekananda’s inner discipline meets India’s contemporary “Lifestyle for Environment” policy vocabulary. India’s 2031–35 NDC explicitly places sustainable lifestyles and people-centric behavioural change alongside technology and policy. The philosophical contribution Vivekananda adds is motive: restraint should not be marketed as guilt. It can be experienced as freedom — swaraj over appetite. “They alone live who live for others, the rest are more dead than alive.”— Swami Vivekananda, Our Duty to the Masses STRENGTH IS NOT DOMINATION; IT IS RESILIENCE Vivekananda’s language of strength is often reduced to posters. In context, he wanted people who could stand on their own feet — physically, intellectually, morally and economically. “What we want is muscles of iron and nerves of steel,” he wrote. For the climate age, that strength can be re-read as resilience. A resilient India needs more than sea walls and drainage pumps. It needs farmers who can access climate information and diverse seeds; cities that protect outdoor workers during extreme heat; neighbourhoods with functioning local institutions; schools that can serve as safe shelters; health systems prepared for heat stress and vector-borne disease; youth trained in green skills; women with financial and decision-making power; and communities that can recover without falling permanently into debt. It also needs psychological resilience. Climate anxiety is rational when the risks are real, but paralysis is not a strategy. Vivekananda’s fearlessness, abhaya, is useful precisely because it is not denial. It asks us to look squarely at danger and still act. The climate movement needs fewer apocalyptic performances and more durable workers — scientists, engineers, farmers, teachers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, journalists and citizens capable of staying with a problem after the trending hashtag has disappeared. SCIENCE IN ONE HAND, SPIRITUAL PURPOSE IN THE OTHER Vivekananda was not anti-modern. His writings repeatedly engage scientific language and he wanted India to absorb modern knowledge, technology, organisation and productive skill without surrendering its spiritual centre. Belur Math’s account of his national vision records his emphasis on improved agriculture, village industries, education and material knowledge for the uplift of ordinary people. That synthesis is the opposite of both technophobia and techno-solutionism. Climate change will not be solved by meditation. India needs grids, storage, renewable power, electrified mobility, efficient buildings, lower-carbon industry, resilient crops, modern water systems, early-warning networks, circular manufacturing and better climate data. But technology does not decide the purpose of development. Ethics must still ask: Is a “green” mine socially just? Does an electric-vehicle transition improve public transport or simply replace one private car with another? Does a solar park respect land rights and biodiversity? Does artificial intelligence cut waste or merely accelerate consumption? India’s newest NDC makes the scale of the transition visible: by 2035 it targets a 47 per cent reduction in emissions intensity of GDP from 2005 levels, about 60 per cent of cumulative installed electric-power capacity from non-fossil sources, and a 3.5–4.0 billion tonne CO₂-equivalent carbon sink through forest and tree cover relative to 2005. As of February 2026, the NDC reported non-fossil sources at 52.57 per cent of installed power capacity. These are infrastructure numbers. Vivekananda’s challenge is to ensure that the civilisation built around that infrastructure is just, restrained and humane. “Education is the manifestation of the perfection already in man.”— Swami Vivekananda, What We Believe In WORK AS WORSHIP — AND THE GREEN ECONOMY OF DIGNITY Vivekananda’s Karma Yoga dignified work by changing its inner logic: work could become a path of freedom when performed with competence, integrity and reduced attachment to egoistic reward. For sustainability, that insight shifts the debate from the prestige of a “green” label to the quality and consequences of work itself. A job is not sustainable merely because it sits inside a renewable-energy company; it must also be safe, fairly paid, socially useful and ecologically responsible. India’s green transition will create and transform work across construction, batteries, public transport, solar installation, energy efficiency, waste recovery, ecosystem restoration, sustainable tourism, water management and climate-smart agriculture. But a circular economy cannot be morally circular if the people who sort waste remain unprotected, or if repair technicians are treated as inferior to the consumers whose products they extend. Vivekananda’s insistence on dignity and capability asks us to see the recycler, artisan, farm worker, mason, driver and technician as participants in national regeneration, not as invisible labour at the bottom of a value chain. The same applies to rural India. Vivekananda wanted practical knowledge, improved agriculture and village industries to reach ordinary people. In the climate age, that becomes a programme of local resilience: soil and water restoration, farmer-producer institutions, agroecological knowledge tested against science, decentralised clean energy, value addition close to the farm, local repair economies and enterprises that keep more income within communities. Sustainability is stronger when a village can maintain the systems installed in its name, rather than waiting for an external agency to return after the pilot project ends. This also reframes entrepreneurship. The green entrepreneur is not simply someone who finds a premium niche for affluent consumers. The deeper challenge is to make low-carbon and regenerative choices cheaper, accessible and aspirational for the majority: cooling that does not bankrupt households, mobility that works without private cars, packaging systems that genuinely circulate, clean energy for small enterprises, and finance that reaches women and first-generation entrepreneurs. Practical Vedanta, applied economically, is capability with conscience — enterprise that builds strength without manufacturing new forms of dependence. A VIVEKANANDA-INSPIRED DAILY CODE: 10 PRACTICESMind before mobile: Begin with 10–20 minutes of silence, breath, prayer or meditation before screens.Strengthen the instrument: Walk, exercise, practise yoga or play a sport; physical capacity supports public action.Eat with gratitude: Prefer nutritious, seasonal/local choices where practical; eliminate avoidable food waste.Work as Karma Yoga: Single-task, concentrate, act ethically and detach ego from applause.Need before want: Delay non-essential purchases; repair, reuse, borrow and choose durable goods.Use energy consciously: Switch off waste, moderate cooling, choose efficient devices and cleaner mobility.Re-enter nature: Spend daily time with trees, sky, soil, water or a neighbourhood park; observe, do not merely consume scenery.Serve weekly: Commit regular time to a social or ecological cause without making yourself the centre.Digital self-rule: Turn off non-essential notifications; create no-screen windows morning and night.Nightly audit: Ask: What did I waste? Whom did I help? What burden did my convenience shift to others? EDUCATION FOR EARTH CITIZENS, NOT JUST EXAM TAKERS “Education is the manifestation of the perfection already in man,” Vivekananda wrote. His idea of education was character-forming, confidence-building and life-making. Climate education needs exactly that breadth. A child who can define the greenhouse effect but cannot connect it to food, water, transport, waste or neighbourhood heat has information, not ecological agency. A Vivekananda-inspired sustainability curriculum would be experiential. Children would grow food, map trees, observe birds, test water, audit electricity, measure household waste, repair objects, interview farmers and waste workers, study indigenous practices critically, design low-waste celebrations and prepare local adaptation plans. They would learn to detect greenwashing and misinformation. Science would supply evidence; ethics would supply responsibility; teamwork would convert both into action. This is also why dignity of labour matters. A circular economy depends on people who collect, segregate, repair, refurbish and recycle. Renewable energy depends on technicians. Regenerative agriculture depends on skilled cultivators. Urban resilience depends on sanitation and water workers. The sustainable future cannot be built while the workers who maintain it remain socially invisible. Vivekananda’s “man-making” education, stated in the gendered language of his time, must become person-making education for equal citizenship and planetary stewardship. “They alone live who live for others, the rest are more dead than alive.”— Swami Vivekananda, Our Duty to the Masses THE 24-HOUR PRACTICAL VEDANTA OF SUSTAINABLE LIVING The attached idea of a Vivekananda-inspired daily discipline becomes most persuasive when stripped of rigidity and turned into principles. The goal is not to imitate a monk’s timetable. It is to train attention so that sustainability becomes character rather than an annual campaign. Begin the day without immediately surrendering the mind to the phone. Create a short interval of silence, breathing, prayer or meditation — not as an ecological act in itself, but as training in non-reactivity. Strengthen the body through walking, yoga, sport or exercise; a citizen exhausted by preventable ill-health has less capacity for long public work. Eat with attention, preferring nutritious, seasonal and locally appropriate food and wasting as little as possible. Work with concentration rather than permanent digital fragmentation. Buy with a “need versus want” pause. Spend some time outdoors, not for decorative wellness but to restore direct acquaintance with the more-than-human world. Then make service habitual. Give time each week to a civic or ecological task: tutor a child, assist during a heatwave, restore a pond, support a community kitchen, document local biodiversity, help segregate waste at an event, mentor a green enterprise or participate in a resident campaign for trees and footpaths. End the day with a small audit: Did I waste food, water or energy? Did I buy reflexively? Did my convenience shift a burden onto someone else? Did I help anyone without needing recognition? That is sustainability as sadhana — disciplined practice. Digital restraint belongs here too. The attention economy is an ecological issue because it accelerates advertising, impulse buying, device turnover and mental restlessness. Notifications are tiny claims on consciousness. To turn them off for chosen periods is not anti-technology; it is self-government. Vivekananda’s “internal nature” has acquired an algorithmic frontier. “The national ideals of India are RENUNCIATION and SERVICE.”— Swami Vivekananda, Reawakening of Hinduism on a National Basis UNIVERSALISM FOR A BORDERLESS ATMOSPHERE Vivekananda’s 1893 intervention at the World’s Parliament of Religions is remembered for interfaith fellowship. Its deeper political relevance today lies in his confidence that rootedness need not become hostility. Climate change needs precisely this combination. Carbon dioxide carries no passport. Himalayan hydrology binds countries together. Cyclones cross maritime boundaries. Air pollution travels. Oceans connect coasts. Species migrate. Climate finance, clean technology, disaster information and adaptation knowledge require cooperation even when geopolitics is difficult. India can draw strength from its own civilisational vocabulary while remaining scientifically open and globally collaborative. Vivekananda’s universalism also warns against environmental tribalism. Climate action cannot become a new purity contest in which citizens compete to appear morally cleaner than neighbours. Karma Yoga is anti-fanatical: work hard, stay unattached to ego, learn from evidence, and keep sympathy alive. The objective is not to win a lifestyle argument. It is to reduce harm and enlarge capability at scale. “It is a privilege to serve mankind, for this is the worship of God.”— Swami Vivekananda, Vedanta and Privilege ARISE, AWAKE — FROM CONSUMER TO CITIZEN “Arise, awake and stop not till the desired end is reached.”— Swami Vivekananda, Reply to the Calcutta Address “Education is the manifestation of the perfection already in man.”— Swami Vivekananda, What We Believe In The twenty-first century does not need a decorative Vivekananda framed above a stage while our economic life proceeds untouched. It needs the unsettling Vivekananda: the critic of privilege, the advocate of the masses, the organiser, the educator, the monk who demanded fearlessness and work, the Vedantin who insisted that unity must become practice. He does not give India a climate-policy manual. He gives it a theory of the human being capable of carrying a transition. That human being is inwardly freer from compulsive desire, outwardly energetic, scientifically curious, socially responsible, physically and mentally strong, respectful of difference and committed to the welfare of those with the least power. Such an India would refuse the false choice between development and ecology. It would expand electricity, housing, cooling, mobility and opportunity for those who need them while reducing wasteful luxury and pollution. It would build renewable energy without treating land and communities as expendable. It would make cities richer in public transport, shade, water, public space and clean air — not merely richer in private consumption. It would value repair workers and farmers alongside software engineers. It would judge corporations by what their core business does, not by the polish of their sustainability reports. It would make schools laboratories of stewardship. Most of all, it would change the definition of prosperity: from possession to capability, from extraction to regeneration, from status to fulfilment, from charity to justice, from ritual spirituality to responsible living. “Arise, awake and stop not till the desired end is reached,” Vivekananda urged. The words came through the Katha Upanishad and became inseparable from his public voice. In our century, the desired end cannot be national greatness on an unlivable planet. A sustainable India worthy of Vivekananda would be strong enough to restrain itself, modern enough to learn, spiritual enough to serve, and confident enough to cooperate. It would understand that the deepest climate technology is not a gadget but a civilisation’s capacity to govern desire. The green transition will be won not only in power plants, factories, farms and transport systems, but also in kitchens, classrooms, boardrooms, voting booths and the human mind. That is why Vivekananda belongs in the sustainability conversation — not as a prophet who predicted the Anthropocene, but as a seer who understood its moral anatomy. The bell has rung. Arise — not merely as consumers, but as citizens. Awake — not merely to personal ambition, but to planetary responsibility. And stop not until progress itself becomes compatible with the dignity and flourishing of life. ARISE — NOT MERELY AS CONSUMERS, BUT AS CITIZENS.AWAKE — NOT MERELY TO PERSONAL AMBITION, BUT TO PLANETARY RESPONSIBILITY. ...Read more